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Exploding Productivity Growth:
Context, Causes, and Implications
Will potential output grow in the future at a 4 percent annual rate, as
several of the more optimistic business economists assume, or at the
pathetic 1.8 percent annual rate assumed into the distant future by the
trustees of the Social Security Administration?1 Put differently, will real
GDP in seventy-ﬁve years be 20 times its current level or a mere
3
1⁄2 times? Academic research on future supply-side issues has focused
mainly on the causes of the post-1995 productivity growth revival, but the
growth rate of potential output is of independent interest. Variations in
four factors—population growth, labor force participation, the unemploy-
ment rate, and hours worked per employee—can create signiﬁcant differ-
ences between the long-run path of potential output and that of trend
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1. A long-term real GDP growth path of 4 percent a year and a 4 percent permanent
unemployment rate are endorsed in Glassman (2002) and displayed in his ﬁgure 4. The
long-run real GDP growth path in the Social Security projections tapers down from 3.0 per-
cent to 2.0 percent between 2003 and 2015, rests at 1.9 percent from 2020 to 2040, and then
falls to 1.8 percent between 2040 and 2080 (Board of Trustees, 2003, table V.B.2, p. 99).
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balance of world saving and investment, and the role of the United States
as an engine of growth for the rest of the world.
This paper has three goals. The ﬁrst is to forecast growth in U.S. poten-
tial real GDP, not for the full seventy-ﬁve-year horizon of the Social
Security trustees, but for the more modest but still daunting span of the
next two decades. It brings together recent research both about productiv-
ity and about the likely future behavior of the other four factors, espe-
cially population growth, that matter for potential output growth. The
need to predict future population growth in turn requires an exploration of
the determinants of trends in fertility and mortality rates, as well as the
likely future trend of net immigration into the United States. 
The second goal of the paper, connected closely with the ﬁrst, is to
interpret the extraordinary productivity performance of the United States
since 1995 and especially since mid-2000. Far from slowing in response
to the 2001 recession and the collapse of investment in information and
communications technology (ICT) after mid-2000, growth in labor pro-
ductivity actually accelerated from an average of 2.56 percent a year
between 1995:4 and 2000:2 to 3.46 percent a year between 2000:2 and
2003:2. Should a forecast of future productivity growth use as its prece-
dent the average behavior of actual productivity growth over the past two
years, the past eight years, or some longer interval? 
The third goal of the paper, related to the ﬁrst two, is to provide a new
breakdown of past U.S. economic growth into its trend and cyclical com-
ponents. In assessing long-term growth performance over some historical
period, one would not want to include the portion of real GDP growth
contributed by a sharp difference in cyclical conditions, for example
between the 7.6 percent unemployment rate of mid-1992 and the 4.0 per-
cent rate of early 2000. This paper bases its cyclical analysis on an iden-
tity that links real GDP to productivity, the employment rate, and several
other variables. This analysis uncovers important changes in cyclical
behavior between the earlier postwar downturns and the two recent job-
less recessions and recoveries (1990–93 and 2001–03). One particularly
important difference is the strength of productivity growth and the weak-
ness of payroll employment growth in both of the most recent episodes
and especially the latest. 
To predict the future, one naturally starts with the past. But how much
of the past? This is not a question on which either economic or statistical
208 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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after 1995 than between 1972 and 1995, but if one is trying to make fore-
casts twenty or more years into the future, the slow-growth period has at
least some relevance, as do the more rapid growth periods 1950–72 and
1995–2003. Sometimes one has good economic reasons for looking at
only part of history, believing strongly, for instance, that the economic
dislocations of the Great Depression and World War II will not recur.
When making demographic forecasts of future population growth, it is
quite certain that fertility rates will never return to those of the baby-boom
era of 1947 to 1963, when the average female of childbearing age had
between three and four children.2 But is it possible to be so sure which
decades into the past are relevant for predictions of immigration? 
This paper of necessity is limited to data for the United States. But one
should keep in mind the dimension of “American exceptionalism” that
pervades international comparisons. In forecasting over a period as long
as two decades, it is important to at least consider the possibility that the
United States could become more like other developed countries in some
aspects in which it has long been unusual, instead of continuing to
diverge. The most important aspects of American exceptionalism in the
recent past have been the productivity growth revival, the absence of a
decline in hours of work per employee, the relatively high level of fertil-
ity, and the important role of immigration in maintaining population
growth.
In examining the third topic, the separation of cycle and trend, I adopt
a modern version of Okun’s Law and deﬁne potential real GDP as the out-
put that the economy can produce at its nonaccelerating-inﬂation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU), also known as the natural rate of unemploy-
ment.3 My analysis of cycles uses the output identity that links potential
output to the employment rate and other variables. By estimating regres-
sion equations that explain changes in the employment rate and the other
variables by changes in detrended real GDP, one can achieve a complete
decomposition of each component of the identity into measures of trend,
regular cyclical patterns, and residual terms that reveal unusual behavior
not predicted by the regressions. 
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2. The U.S. total fertility rate reached 3.7 births per woman of childbearing age in the
interval 1958–61. See Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (2003, ﬁgure 1,
p. 23).
3. Okun (1962).
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one to address a wide set of issues, including some unusual aspects of the
economic boom of 1995–2000, the 2001 recession, and the recovery since
late 2001, viewed both on their own and in comparison with past business
cycles. For instance, why has payroll employment been so much weaker
in 2002–03 than in 1991–92, the episode that launched the term “jobless
recovery,” even though the unemployment rate is still well below its 1992
peak? Is this discrepancy partly due to a greater than normal downturn in
the labor force participation rate (LFPR), suggesting a rise in discouraged
workers? Have hours per employee held up better than usual, so that ﬁrms
are hiring less because they are working their existing employees harder?
Or is there a measurement issue in the form of unusual behavior in the
ratio of employment as reported from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) payroll survey to that reported from the BLS household survey (the
payroll-to-household employment ratio)? 
The paper tackles the three goals in reverse order, beginning with the
output identity and the econometric decomposition of trend and cycle.
Using those results, the paper proceeds to discuss unusual aspects of pro-
ductivity and employment behavior over the period 2000–03. Finally,
armed with insights from these analyses, the paper proceeds to the two-
decade long-term forecasts.
The paper begins by establishing notation and deﬁning the output iden-
tity. The ﬁrst examination of the data over the 1954–2003 period is based
on deﬁning log-linear trends through certain designated benchmark quar-
ters (hereafter called the trends-through-benchmark, or TTB method) and
examining the behavior of those trends for each component of the output
identity.4 The next step is to go beyond the TTB detrending method with
two alternative statistical techniques for estimating trends, the Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter and the Kalman ﬁlter. A careful consideration of the differ-
ences and limitations of all three techniques leads to a hybrid concept of
the potential output trend, based on a mix of all three methods. 
Having established trends for each variable, I then reassess, for each
component of the identity, the Okun’s Law coefﬁcient using both a non-
210 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
4. Two of my previous Brookings Papers (Gordon, 1979, 1993) were limited to an
examination of the trend and cyclical behavior of labor productivity. An additional paper
(Gordon, 1984) explored the trend and cyclical behavior of the output identity but primar-
ily limited its attention to the 1981–82 recession and the early phase of the 1983–84 recov-
ery. Earlier uses of the output identity were by Clark (1983) and Woodham (1984).
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regression analysis. The regression analysis yields a distinction between
normal cyclical behavior and residual, unexplained behavior that empha-
sizes the differences between the two jobless recoveries of 1991–92 and
2001–03 and previous cyclical episodes. 
The econometric results, which reveal a substantial residual compo-
nent in productivity and aggregate hours in 2001–03, raise both measure-
ment and substantive issues. A central puzzle is the interpretation of rapid
productivity growth after 2000 in the context of the crash of ICT invest-
ment along with the stock market. Was the role of ICT investment in the
1995–2000 productivity revival exaggerated, and if so, why? Balancing
the overemphasis on ICT investment in the recent literature has been a
neglect of other aspects of the post-2000 acceleration, including the
delayed beneﬁts of intangible capital, the intensity of corporate cost cut-
ting, and increased outsourcing to foreign countries.
The paper concludes by discussing some issues involved in projecting
the components of the output identity two decades into the future, with an
emphasis on productivity, population growth, and changes in hours per
employee. This section contains no econometrics, but rather introduces
the kinds of decisions that must be made in carrying out such forecasts, as
well as a set of forecast numbers intended to focus subsequent discussion
rather than to provide precise and deﬁnitive answers. 
Trends, Cycles, and Residuals
This section establishes the notation to be used throughout the paper
and deﬁnes the output identity. It then explores which components of the
output identity account for differences between the growth rates of output
per capita and of productivity over time. Finally, it considers alternative
methods of distinguishing trends from cyclical ﬂuctuations in output and
its components.
The Output Identity: Notation and Deﬁnitions
The output identity is equally useful for distinguishing the compo-
nents of long-run growth in potential GDP and for assessing the cyclical
behavior of Okun’s Law, the regular empirical relationship that allows
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tions in the employment rate, productivity, the LFPR, and hours per
employee. I begin with a simple version of this identity, which decom-
poses real GDP (Q) into output per hour (Q/A), aggregate hours per
employee (A/E), the employment rate (E/L), the LFPR (L/N), and the
working-age population (N).5
At this stage I suppress time subscripts, since all of the variables in equa-
tion 1 and the subsequent versions of the output identity are contempora-
neous. The right-hand side contains four elements that typically display
procyclical behavior (albeit with different sets of leads and lags relative to
total output), namely, output per hour, hours per employee, the employ-
ment rate, and the LFPR. One would expect no response of the working-
age population (N) to the business cycle.
The identity in equation 1 is a useful starting point but cannot be used
for empirical analysis of cyclical issues, because it ignores the fact that
productivity data are published on a quarterly basis only for the private
business sector and several subaggregates, particularly the nonfarm pri-
vate business (NFPB) sector. Also of interest are differences in the behav-
ior of employment as reported by the household survey and by the
establishment (or payroll) survey. These complications require that equa-
tion 1 be expanded to identify those variables that refer to the NFPB sec-
tor (designated here with a superscript B). Variables without superscripts
refer to the total economy, except that total employment in the payroll
survey is referred to as EP, to distinguish it from total employment as
measured in the household survey (E):
Equation 2 differs from equation 1 in the last two terms. The next to last
term, which I call the “mix effect,” measures the ratio of output per pay-
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5. The employment rate E/L is simply 1 minus the unemployment rate, that is (1 – U/L).
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from the household survey.
To simplify the notation and allow for the subsequent treatment of
growth rates and ratios of actual to trend, I take the logarithm of each fac-
tor in equation 2 and choose a single letter for each. This relationship
states that, by deﬁnition, the logarithm of real GDP (q) is equal to the sum
of the logarithms of the following: output per hour (p), hours per
employee in the NFPB sector (h), the employment rate (e), the LFPR (f),
the working-age population (n), the mix effect (m), and the payroll-to-
household employment ratio (s):
Of interest are the growth rates of the components of equation 3 over
longer or shorter intervals, the estimated trends of the components, and
the ratios of actual to trend expressed as logarithms. 
Using the same notation, I identify trends, ratios of actual to trend, and
growth rates in the simplest possible way. The trend of the logarithm of
real GDP (q*) is the sum of the same seven components as in equation 3
when each of the components, say, x, is marked with an asterisk. The log
ratio of actual to trend for each component x′ also observes the identity in
equation 3: x′=x – x*. The regression analysis below will study rates of
change in quarterly data. Adding time subscripts, a rate of change is ∆xt =
xt – xt–1. The dependent variable in the regressions is the rate of change of
the deviation of a variable from trend, ∆x′ t = ∆xt – ∆x*t . Rates of change in
the logarithms of actual values, of trend values, and of deviations from
trend all obey equation 3.
Okun’s Law can be expressed in this notation either as a relationship
among deviations from trend or as a relationship among rates of change.
One can deﬁne k as the response of the deviations from trend of the
employment rate relative to total output: 
The coefﬁcient k was one-third in Okun’s original analysis. However, it
has long been recognized that unemployment is a lagging indicator, and
including both the current and the lagged reaction of unemployment and
the employment rate brings the coefﬁcient k up to roughly 0.4 in the new
results presented below. If k = 0.4, then cyclical movements in q′ have
() / . 4 ke q = ′′
() . 3 qp h efnms ≡++ ++++
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rate (e′), and the remaining ﬂuctuations in q′ by deﬁnition must occur
among the other components of the output identity. 
Growth Rates between Benchmark Quarters
My ﬁrst use of the output identity is to see which components account
for differences between the growth rates of output per capita and of pro-
ductivity over time. To carry out this analysis, I need to choose intervals
that are free of marked business cycle ﬂuctuations. At this initial stage of
simple data examination, I choose to calculate growth rates over intervals
between certain “benchmark” quarters, which represent roughly the same
stage of the business cycle. These quarters are those when the actual
unemployment rate is equal to the NAIRU.6 In each business cycle, start-
ing at the trough, the unemployment rate declines through the NAIRU and
in the next recession rises back through the NAIRU; the benchmark quar-
ters occur at the ﬁrst of these events, the quarter when the actual unem-
ployment rate ﬁrst declines below the NAIRU. The one exception is the
last benchmark quarter: 2001:2 was chosen because at that time the unem-
ployment rate had not fallen through the NAIRU as in earlier episodes
such as 1987 and 1994, and instead this quarter was chosen as a time
when the actual unemployment rate was rising through the NAIRU. The
selection of benchmark quarters is further discussed in appendix A. 
Table 1 presents annual growth rates of real GDP and the seven right-
hand-side components of the output identity for six intervals between
benchmark quarters; thus each of the numbers in table 1 is interpreted as a
trend growth rate. Also shown are growth rates for the “last two
episodes,” that is, the most recent eight quarters of data during 2001–03
compared with eight similar quarters of the 1990–92 period. By deﬁni-
tion, as in equation 3, the growth rates of the seven components on the
right-hand side of the identity sum to the growth rate of real GDP in the
ﬁrst column. 
Of the six periods between 1954 and 2001, the second (1963–72)
stands out as having the most rapid growth in real GDP, propelled by
rapid productivity and population growth, only partly offset by negative
growth in hours per employee. The third period had much slower pro-
214 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
6. Here the NAIRU takes the values estimated in Gordon (1998), updated in Eller and
Gordon (2003).
1790-03_Gordon.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 214Table 1. Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP and Components of the Output Identity, 1954–2003
Percent
Contribution of output identity components 
Real   Output    Working-
GDP per Hours per  Employment age  Mix  Employment
Period growth houra employeea rate LFPR population effectb ratioc
Between benchmark quarters
1954:4–1963:3 3.51 2.72 –0.16 –0.02 0.03 1.43 –0.27 –0.22
1963:3–1972:2 4.07 2.54 –0.44 –0.02 0.33 1.80 –0.62 0.49
1972:2–1978:3 3.43 1.72 –0.60 –0.06 0.73 1.94 –0.38 0.08
1978:3–1987:3 2.69 1.20 –0.26 0.00 0.41 1.39 0.06 –0.12
1987:3–1994:4 2.71 1.48 –0.01 0.06 0.23 1.08 –0.42 0.28
1994:4–2001:2 3.21 2.11 –0.31 0.19 0.02 1.24 –0.61 0.57
Last two episodes
1990:3–1992:3 1.32 1.95 0.01 –1.04 0.10 1.07 –0.26 –0.50
2001:2–2003:2 2.21 4.52 –0.46 –0.92 –0.27 1.20 –1.03 –0.83
Source: See appendix A.
a. Data are for the nonfarm private business sector.
b. Ratio of output per employee in the economy as a whole, from the payroll survey, to that in the nonfarm private business sector.













































5ductivity growth but was notable for the fastest growth in the LFPR and
in population of any period, partly offset by the fastest rate of decline in
hours per employee of any period. After 1978 there was slower growth in
productivity, the LFPR, and the population, causing average annual out-
put growth to fall to 2.69 percent in 1978–87 and 2.71 percent in
1987–94. Real GDP growth accelerated by 0.50 percentage point between
1987–94 and 1994–2001, somewhat less than the 0.63-percentage-point
acceleration in productivity growth. 
When one compares the most recent eight quarters with similar quarters
in 1990–92, the biggest difference is that productivity growth has been
2.57 percentage points faster in 2001–03, but real GDP growth has been
only 0.89 percentage point faster. This difference is primarily explained by
the large negative values for the mix effect and the payroll-to-household
employment ratio. Notice that, in all lines but the ﬁrst in the top panel of
the table, the growth rates of the mix effect and the payroll-to-household
employment ratio are of opposite sign, whereas in 2001–03 the two
growth rates both had relatively large negative signs. 
These points are made with a different arrangement of the same data in
table 2. There the annual growth rates of real GDP per capita and produc-
tivity are shown in the ﬁrst two columns and their difference in the third.7
By deﬁnition, this difference must equal the sum of the contribution of the
three labor market variables (employment rate, the LFPR, and hours per
employee) plus the sum of the mix and employment ratio effects. For the
six intervals between benchmark quarters, the difference between real
GDP per capita and productivity is relatively small. But for the last two
episodes the difference is huge, –1.70 percentage points for 1990–92 and
–3.51 percentage points for 2001–03. In both periods the explanation is
roughly evenly divided between the labor market variables and the mix
and employment ratio effects. 
Establishing Trends: Choosing a Methodology and a Parameter 
To examine the cyclical behavior of components of the output identity,
it is necessary to divide actual changes into cyclical and trend elements.
And to project the components over the next two decades, the best possi-
ble measures of trend behavior, especially in the recent past, are needed.
216 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
7. Here “per capita” means “per member of the working-age population,” not the usual
“per member of the total population.”
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Although useful in providing summary information about the growth
rates of output and its components over a uniform set of historical inter-
vals, these trends are less useful for the subsequent analysis. When the
primary variable of interest is the rate of change of a trend, the TTB
method generates instantaneous jumps up or down in this rate of change
at the benchmark quarters, as in table 1. As a consequence of these jumps,
the TTB method understates trend growth before a positive jump in a
trend rate of change and overstates it after such a jump. To create trends
that exhibit smooth rather than jumpy behavior in their rates of change, I
consider two alternative techniques, the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ﬁlter and
the Kalman ﬁlter. 
The H-P ﬁlter is perhaps the most commonly used detrending method
in macroeconomics, presumably because it allows the trend to move con-
tinuously and because it is easy to understand and to use in estimation. Its
primary ﬂaw is that the estimated trends from any given time series can
exhibit wildly different behavior, depending on the smoothness parameter
chosen, and that choice of parameter is entirely arbitrary. At one extreme,
the choice of a parameter of zero yields a trend that exactly tracks every
value of the series being detrended. At the other extreme, a parameter of
Robert J. Gordon 217




Growth in  Labor  Mix and  
real GDP  Output  market  employment
Period per  capitaa per hourb Differencec variablesd effectse
1954:4–1963:3 2.08 2.72 –0.64 –0.15 –0.49
1963:3–1972:2 2.27 2.54 –0.27 –0.13 –0.13
1972:2–1978:3 1.49 1.72 –0.23 0.07 –0.30
1978:3–1987:3 1.30 1.20 0.10 0.15 –0.06
1987:3–1994:4 1.63 1.48 0.15 0.28 –0.14
1994:4–2001:2 1.97 2.11 –0.14 0.10 –0.04
1990:3–1992:3 0.25 1.95 –1.70 –0.93 –0.76
2001:2–2003:2 1.01 4.52 –3.51 –1.65 –1.86
Source: See appendix A.
a. Per member of the working-age population.
b. Data are for the nonfarm private business sector.
c. Difference between the ﬁrst and second data columns, equals the sum of the last two data columns.
d. Employment rate, LFPR, and hours per employee.
e. Deﬁned as in table 1. 
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a relatively low value for the smoothness parameter creates a trend series
that bends frequently in response to changes in the actual series and hence
implies relatively small deviations of the actual values from trend; a high
parameter value creates a relatively smooth trend and relatively larger
deviations from trend. The other problem is that H-P ﬁltering does not
explicitly allow for cyclical variations that are distinct from variations in
the trend.
The parameter endorsed by Robert Hodrick and Edward Prescott them-
selves is a relatively low value (1,600), which implies implausibly large
accelerations and decelerations of the trend within each business cycle.8
For instance, Finn E. Kydland and Prescott use this parameter to conclude
that the entire economic boom of the 1960s resulted from an acceleration
of trend, rather than a deviation of actual output above trend.9 This con-
clusion ignores outside information, such as the fact that the unemploy-
ment rate was unusually low and the capacity utilization rate was
unusually high.
An alternative technique is the Kalman ﬁlter.10 This can be used to esti-
mate time-varying coefﬁcients in any type of time-series model, whether
a complex multiequation model or a single equation. The application used
here is even simpler, the estimation of a single time-varying coefﬁcient in
a single equation, without allowing the other coefﬁcients in that single
equation to change. Detrending methods make little difference for most of
the components of the output identity, which tend to evolve smoothly
over time, but detrending methods and parameter choices are crucial for
218 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
8. There is no justiﬁcation for this parameter anywhere in the literature. The justiﬁca-
tion in the original H-P paper (Hodrick and Prescott, 1981) is simply stated as “our prior
view.” The parameter 1,600 is the square of the ratio of a cyclical deviation from trend to
the adjustment per quarter of that trend. In the authors’ example, a 5 percent deviation of
output from trend would cause the trend growth rate to adjust in the same direction by 1/8
percent per quarter, or 
1⁄2 percent a year, or by 2 percent a year if that 5 percent output gap
were sustained for four years. The value 1,600 is the square of the ratio of the cyclical com-
ponent (5) to the per-quarter adjustment of trend (1/8): 1,600 = (5/0.125)2. Applying this
parameter to 1929–33 and assuming an initial trend growth rate of 3 percent a year, a sus-
tained 25 percent output gap would cause the growth rate of potential output to decline
from +3 percent a year in 1929 to –7 percent a year in 1933. 
9. Kydland and Prescott (1990, chart 2, p. 9).
10. The technique originated in Kalman (1960). A complete (and highly technical)
treatment of the ﬁlter is contained in Hamilton (1994, chapter 13). As Hamilton shows, the
Kalman ﬁlter has many uses beyond the estimation of time-varying coefﬁcients. 
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Hence my example of the estimation of time-varying coefﬁcients with the
Kalman ﬁlter explains the change in productivity growth (∆pt) by a time-
varying constant and any set of other explanatory variables (βXt):
The next step is to specify a time-series process for the time-varying pro-
ductivity trend, and the most straightforward is a random walk:
The error terms of this two-equation system are
In estimating this system a smoothness parameter must be speciﬁed to
control the variance of the random walk process (τ2), and this then allows
a range of trend rates of change to be obtained, from very jumpy to very
smooth, just as in the case of the H-P ﬁlter.11
The two techniques share the weakness that the user must specify the
smoothness parameter. The advantage of the Kalman ﬁlter is that any
additional number of variables (Xt) in equation 5 may be speciﬁed to con-
trol for determinants of actual productivity changes that do not represent
fundamental causes of changes in the trend; for example, the X variables
could include changes in unemployment or the output gap, or dislocations
caused by short-run events such as strikes or temporary changes in oil
prices. In contrast, the H-P ﬁlter cannot by its design use any outside
information, such as the fact that slow and even negative productivity
growth in the early 1980s occurred at a time when the output gap was at a
record negative level.
Here I compare alternative measures of the trend growth in productiv-
ity in two steps. The top panel of ﬁgure 1 compares the TTB method with
several alternative H-P parameters, and the bottom panel compares a
wN O vN O tt ~( ,) ;~( ,) . στ 22
() . – 6 1 αα tt t v =+
() . 5 ∆pX w tt tt =+ + αβ
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11. Hamilton (1994, p. 400) provides an exposition in which the movement of the time-
varying parameter(s) is governed by an adaptive process in which the current parameter is
a weighted average of the lagged parameter and the mean value of the parameter, and the
random walk model in equation 6 is a special case where the weight on the lagged parame-
ter is unity. Hamilton cites Doan, Literman, and Sims (1984) as an early example of the use
of the adaptive formulation.
1790-03_Gordon.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 219Figure 1. Alternative Estimates of Four-Quarter Trend in Growth in Output per
Hour, 1954–2003
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
a. H-P, Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter; TTB, trend through benchmark.
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segments of the line labeled “TTB” plot the same set of productivity
growth rates as are shown in the second column of table 1. The TTB trend
growth rate is slightly above 2.5 percent a year during 1954–72, slows to
1.2 percent in 1978–87, and then rises to a ﬁnal value of 2.1 percent in
1994–2001.12
The top panel of ﬁgure 1 contrasts the TTB trend with H-P trends using
three different smoothness parameter values: the 1,600 parameter
endorsed by Hodrick and Prescott and used by most H-P users, and two
higher (smoother) parameters, 6,400 and 25,600. The excess sensitivity of
the 1,600 parameter is evident in the crash dive of trend productivity in
response to the back-to-back recessions of 1980–82, its soaring recovery
in 1983–86, and then its milder dive during the 1990–91 recession. The
6,400 and 25,600 parameters present successively smoother versions of
history, and the higher parameter exhibits little response to low economic
output in 1980–82 and none to the 1990–91 recession. However, the
25,600 parameter has the disadvantage that its inability to “bend” causes
it to date the beginning of the productivity growth revival of the 1990s
well before 1995, and it measures the productivity growth trend in
2002–03 at a relatively low 2.35 percent a year. As a compromise, I use
hereafter the H-P ﬁlter with a parameter of 6,400, which produces a ﬁnal
mid-2003 value for trend productivity growth of 2.76 percent a year.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 compares the H-P 6,400 trend with two
versions of a Kalman trend based on a time-varying coefﬁcient as in equa-
tion 5 above. As the additional explanatory variable set (Xt), I use the cur-
rent and four leading values of the change in the output gap, which in turn
is deﬁned as the log ratio of real GDP to its TTB-based trend. I use leads
rather than lags because a consistent feature of the data is that productiv-
ity leads output, which in turn leads aggregate hours of work; table 5
below regresses changes in hours on lagged changes in the output gap and
regresses productivity on leading changes in the output gap. 
The two Kalman trends in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 differ only in
that one includes and the other excludes the output gap variable, thus
allowing visual inspection of the impact of including the output gap as a
piece of outside information that is unavailable to the H-P ﬁlter. The
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12. Figure 1 extrapolates the 1994–2001 TTB trend to 2003:2, thus ignoring any infor-
mation on rapid productivity growth actually achieved between 2001:2 and 2003:2.
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H-P 6,400 trend except in the last few quarters: it has a terminal value of
3.14 percent a year, considerably above the terminal H-P value of 2.74 per-
cent a year. Both the no-gap Kalman trend and the H-P trend exhibit vir-
tually identical plunges in trend productivity growth in the 1978–83
period, corresponding to a period of negative growth in the output gap,
whereas the with-gap Kalman trend has a much smoother proﬁle over the
entire 1978–88 decade. Similarly, the no-gap Kalman trend exhibits a
hump in the 1963–68 period, as does the H-P trend, whereas the Kalman
trend using the output gap variable displays a smoother pattern, register-
ing a slower trend in 1962–68 when the output gap was rising and a faster
trend in 1968–76 when the output gap was declining.13
In developing the Kalman trends shown in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1,
I considered numerous values of the smoothing parameter and based the
choice on two criteria.14 First, the Kalman trend that omits the output gap
variable behaves with uncanny similarity to the HP 6,400 trend, so that
these two trends are consistent in their notion of smoothness. Second, the
same Kalman smoothness parameter provides an optimistic interpretation
of the 2002–03 surge in actual productivity growth and thus leans against
the natural tendency to view the 2002–03 behavior skeptically, as an
ephemeral event. The terminal value for the Kalman trend (using output) is
3.38 percent a year, and an alternative parameter that imposes additional
smoothness yields a terminal value of 2.96 percent a year.15
Although the Kalman trend that includes the output gap variable might
seem to be the best choice, it suffers from an important defect. Since the
time-varying trend is estimated in an equation explaining the growth rate
of productivity, the resulting growth trend provides no information on the
level of the productivity trend or on the ratio of actual to trend at any par-
222 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
13. For the full period through 2002:2, the Kalman ﬁlter that uses the output gap is
based on the current and four leading values. The trend is extrapolated through 2003:2
using an alternative version based on the current and four lagged values.
14. Estimation was performed using the RATS DLM procedure, using a routine that
was developed for this purpose with the help of Tom Doan, author of RATS. The “sv”
parameter that controls the variance of the “v” error term in equation 6 was set alternatively
at values of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32. The plots in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 and the Kalman
trends used in the rest of the paper are based on setting sv equal to 16.
15. The Kalman trends in ﬁgure 1 are based on a smoothness parameter sv = 16, and
the alternative result cited in the text, which imposes greater smoothness, is estimated with
sv = 32. 
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trend productivity in mid-2003?—cannot be answered with this tech-
nique. The H-P ﬁlter, in contrast, is estimated on the level of productivity
and thus generates both the level and the growth rate of trend productivity
automatically, and, as the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 shows, it estimates a
substantially lower trend (and a higher ratio of actual to trend) in mid-
2003 than does the Kalman ﬁlter.16
In the end I have chosen not to rely exclusively on the Kalman ﬁlter
version with the output gap variable but rather to create a trend that is an
average of this Kalman trend and the H-P 6,400 trend shown in the same
ﬁgure. To determine the level of the trend, I have imposed the constraint
that the mean log deviation of actual productivity from trend over the
period 1954:4 to 2003:2 is exactly zero; this constraint yields three series
for the deviation of actual productivity from trend, shown in ﬁgure 2: one
using the with-output Kalman series in ﬁgure 1, one based on the H-P
6,400 trend, and the average of the two. The time paths of the two alterna-
tive ratios of actual to trend are very similar, and because the H-P trend
tends to respond to cyclical movements in the actual value more than the
Kalman trend, the actual-to-trend ratio for the H-P series in ﬁgure 2 tends
to lie “inside” the Kalman series (that is, closer to zero), as is evident in
1963–69, 1979–83, and 1993–2001. 
Perhaps the most surprising conclusion from ﬁgure 2 is that both trend
methods imply that the level of actual productivity was below trend
throughout the entire period 1993–2001; the H-P ratio of actual to trend
rises substantially above zero only in 2002–03, and the Kalman ratio is
negative over the entire period between early 1993 and mid-2003. These
results refute my earlier position that actual productivity was above trend
in the late 1990s;17 that position was defensible based on data at the time,
but the soaring growth of actual productivity in 2002–03 now pulls the
estimated trend lines well above actual values for the late 1990s.
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16. Considerable effort was devoted to estimating a level model for the Kalman ﬁlter in
which the log-level of productivity was regressed on a time trend with a time-varying coef-
ﬁcient, on a constant, and on various combinations of the level and change of the output
gap. The estimated trend growth rate of productivity had much too little variance, ﬂuctuat-
ing between only 1.75 percent and 2.25 percent over the full forty-eight-year sample
period, even at very low smoothness parameters. I regard those results as implausible, but
further exploration of this issue would require building a more complex time-series model,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
17. Gordon (2000).
1790-03_Gordon.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 223For symmetry, the other components of the output identity are
detrended by the average of the Kalman and H-P growth rate trends, using
the same method and parameters. To save space, I do not plot the growth
trends of these other components; the trends rise and fall smoothly,
reﬂecting movements of growth rates over long periods that are summa-
rized by the TTB trends in table 1. The single exception to using the aver-
age of the Kalman and H-P trends involves the employment rate. The
trends should reﬂect what is meant by changes in potential output, or what
the economy can produce when operating at the NAIRU. The NAIRU
changes slowly in response to structural changes in labor market behavior
and does not suddenly jump up or down in response to booms or slumps.
The counterpart of the NAIRU in this analysis is the trend employment
rate, which is simply one minus the NAIRU. This should evolve indepen-
dently of the business cycle, and no smoothing parameter for the Kalman
or H-P ﬁlter was found to achieve the desired degree of stability; in par-
ticular, the H-P 6,400 trend employment rate falls below 93 percent from
224 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
Figure 2. Deviation of Actual Productivity from Alternative Speciﬁcations of Trend,
1955–2003a
Source: Author’s calculations.
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8 percent. 
The desired stable behavior of the trend employment rate is, however,
achieved when the TTB method is used, yielding the changes in the trend
employment rate illustrated in table 1.18 The TTB trend is almost ﬂat
(table A1 in appendix A lists the unemployment rates in each benchmark
quarter): it exhibits a slight decline between 1955 and 1978, the counter-
part of the gradual upward creep of the NAIRU in that era, then stabilizes
at about 94 percent through 1987 (the counterpart of a 6.0 percent
NAIRU), and then gradually increases to 95 percent by 2001. This last is
the counterpart of the decline of the NAIRU in the 1990s from 6 percent
to 5 percent, which was evident in the early analyses of the time-varying
NAIRU and has been validated since then.19
Summary of Trend Choice and Implications for Real GDP
This discussion of the choice of methodology for trend estimation con-
cludes that the average of a time-varying coefﬁcient estimated with the
Kalman ﬁlter and that estimated with the H-P ﬁlter with a parameter of
6,400 (instead of the conventional 1,600) provides nicely smoothed trend
rates of change for six of the seven components of the right-hand side of
the output identity. The level of the trend for each variable is established
by imposing the constraint that the average ratio of actual to trend is equal
to zero over the full period 1954:4 to 2003:2. The exception is the
employment rate, where the TTB method is used to establish a trend
series that has the desired resemblance to the NAIRU as estimated in
recent studies of inﬂation behavior.
For two labor market variables, the employment rate and the LFPR,
there is a special treatment of the trend in the two years after the ﬁnal
benchmark quarter (2001:2). In each case the trend is set equal to its value
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18. The TTB method yields a trend employment rate series that is very close to the
alternative of using a NAIRU series like that estimated by Eller and Gordon (2003). Since
the two series are so close, simplicity dictates using the TTB method, already described
here, rather than the Eller-Gordon series, which would require considerable additional
explanation.
19. Early estimates of the time-varying NAIRU appeared in the same issue of the Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives (Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997; Gordon, 1997). Updated
estimates showing that the NAIRU leveled off at values slightly above 5 percent after 1999
are reported by Eller and Gordon (2003) and Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001).
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treatment is justiﬁed to avoid treating the cyclical decline in these labor
market variables as a trend rather than a cyclical phenomenon. Special
treatment is not required in earlier episodes. 
The trend in real GDP is simply the sum of the log trends in the seven
component trends for the variables on the right-hand side of equation 3.
The top panel of ﬁgure 3 shows the eight-quarter growth rate of actual
real GDP and its trend, revealing that the real GDP trend avoids both the
sharp step jumps of the TTB trend for real GDP exhibited in table 1 and
the excessive waviness associated with H-P trends. The bottom panel of
ﬁgure 3 exhibits the log ratio of actual to trend real GDP, which clearly
distinguishes the major output losses of 1981–83 from the intermediate
episodes of 1957–58, 1960–61, and 1975–76 and the milder episodes of
1970–71, 1990–91, and 2001–03. 
A New Decomposition Based on Okun’s Law
Before turning to a regression analysis that takes account of lagged
reactions, I employ a crude but revealing technique to determine the con-
tributions of the components of the output identity to cyclical ﬂuctuations
in output. For each of the periods between benchmark quarters, I deter-
mine the quarter when actual real GDP reached its highest log ratio to
trend GDP and the quarter when that ratio was the lowest. Table 3 lists
these peak and trough quarters along with the log ratios of actual to trend
in those quarters for real GDP and the seven right-hand-side components
of the output identity.
An Examination of Ratios of Actual to Trend
Does the actual-to-trend ratio for the employment rate equal roughly
one-third of the actual-to-trend ratio for real GDP, as Okun’s original
analysis would suggest? With two exceptions, the employment response
in peaks lies in a narrow range between 30 and 37 percent of the actual-to-
trend ratio for real GDP (fourth column of table 3 divided by the ﬁrst col-
umn), not far from Okun’s initial value. But in troughs the response of
unemployment is much greater, ranging from 45 to 59 percent, with the
single exception of 1970:4. Taking all episodes, the average response is
226 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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1790-03_Gordon.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 227Table 3. Peak and Trough Values of Actual-to-Trend Log Ratios of Components of Real GDP Growth, 1955–2003
Percent
Output    Working-
Real per Hours per  Employment age  Mix  Employment
Quarter GDP houra employeea rate LFPR population effectb ratiob
Peak quarters
1955:3 4.45 2.56 0.76 1.33 0.57 –0.24 –0.72 0.18
1966:1 5.67 3.44 1.74 1.78 –0.60 –0.07 –0.69 0.08
1973:2 3.99 3.30 0.58 0.87 –0.14 0.14 –1.25 0.49
1978:4 2.69 2.15 0.33 0.15 0.91 0.36 –1.41 0.21
1989:1 2.29 –0.10 0.52 0.76 0.75 0.19 0.09 0.08
2000:2 2.90 –0.35 0.75 1.08 0.58 0.09 –0.41 1.16
Trough quarters
1958:2 –4.60 –1.63 –1.26 –2.08 0.59 –0.22 1.31 –1.31
1970:4 –1.82 –1.32 –0.96 –0.17 0.30 –0.29 0.80 –0.18
1975:1 –5.00 –1.47 –1.37 –2.59 –0.39 0.22 0.46 0.13
1982:4 –8.63 –3.20 –1.34 –5.08 –0.05 0.38 1.73 –1.07
1991:4 –2.54 –0.52 –1.07 –1.41 –0.29 –0.06 0.86 –0.05
2003:2 –2.78 0.94 –0.47 –1.37 –0.44 0.04 –0.52 –0.96
Average at peaks 3.67 1.84 0.78 0.99 0.34 0.08 –0.73 0.37
Average at troughs –4.23 –1.20 –1.08 –2.12 –0.05 0.01 0.77 –0.57
Average, peaks and  3.95 1.52 0.93 1.56 0.20 0.03 –0.75 0.47
troughs (absolute 
value)
Share of total  100 38.4 23.5 39.4 4.9 0.8 –19.1 11.9
change in real 
GDP
Source: Author’s calculations using trend method discussed in the text and data described in appendix A.
a. Data are for the nonfarm private business sector.













































827 percent for peaks and 50 percent for troughs, or 39 percent when peaks
and troughs are averaged together (bottom line of table 3, fourth column). 
Which other components of the output identity are most important in
accounting for output ﬂuctuations? The bottom line of table 3 shows that
productivity makes almost the same contribution as the employment rate,
with a response of 38 percent; hours per employee contributes 24 percent,
and the LFPR only 5 percent. The mix and payroll-household employ-
ment ratio effects together contribute –7 percent, for a total response (net
of rounding error) of 100 percent. These averages disguise varying contri-
butions in particular episodes. In two peak and two trough episodes, the
LFPR contribution has the wrong sign, helping to account for its small
response in the overall average. In the last two peak episodes, the produc-
tivity contribution is negative, but in the ﬁnal trough episode its contribu-
tion is strongly positive. Table 3 thus suggests that sometime after the
mid-1980s the role of productivity in output cycles changed signiﬁcantly. 
A Dynamic Speciﬁcation for the Components of the Output Identity
My primary interest in developing a dynamic speciﬁcation suitable for
regression analysis is to provide the best possible representation of aver-
age cyclical responses of the components of the output identity across
forty-eight years of history. This will be the perspective taken subse-
quently to assess unusual aspects of the expansion of the late 1990s, the
period of recession and early recovery after 2000, and, by way of compar-
ison, the early recovery period of 1991–92.
changes in deviations from trend and an error correction
term. The point of departure for the dynamic speciﬁcation here is work
by Christopher Sims and my own earlier work on cyclical productivity
issues.20 The dependent variable is each of the components of the right-
hand side of the output identity (equation 2), which is transformed into
log values as in equation 3. Each dependent variable is expressed as the
ﬁrst difference of the logarithm of the variable, say, x, and the logarithm
of its trend x*; in the notation introduced above, this is ∆x′ t. This variable
is regressed on a series of lags of the dependent variable and on the ﬁrst
differences of deviations of the logarithm of real GDP from its trend
(∆q′ t). The output deviation variable can in principle enter with leads, the
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ment costs and, for such components as the employment rate and the
LFPR, delays in hiring and ﬁring. The use of leads was introduced by
Sims in his analysis of Granger causality between hours and output.21 I
provide a separate treatment of the productivity component of the output
identity, specifying the productivity-to-output relation alternatively as a
regression with hours lagging behind output,22 or as productivity leading
output.
Two additional variables are added to the traditional regression that
relates the ﬁrst differences of component deviations (∆x′ t) to ﬁrst differ-
ences of output deviations (∆q′ t). The ﬁrst is an error correction term. The
concept of error correction has been linked to that of cointegration, which
can be deﬁned informally as the notion that a linear combination of two
series—for example, the hours deviation and the output deviation—is sta-
tionary.23 When two such variables are cointegrated, a regression consist-
ing entirely of differenced data will be misspeciﬁed, whereas a regression
consisting entirely of level data will omit important constraints. The solu-
tion is to estimate a regression of the ﬁrst difference of one variable on the
ﬁrst difference of the other, adding to the regression an error correction
variable consisting of the lagged log ratio of one variable to the other.24 In
my application of this technique, I impose stationarity on the error correc-
tion term by entering it as the lagged log ratio of actual to trend of the
variable in question, whether it is productivity, the employment rate, or
one of the other components of the identity. In summary, this speciﬁca-
tion explains the rate of change of a deviation from trend by the rates of
change of the deviation from trend of the lagged dependent variable and
of output, and the lagged level of the deviation of the dependent variable
from its own trend.
the end-of-expansion effect. In my 1979 paper, veriﬁed and
extended in 1993, I identiﬁed a tendency in the late stages of a business
expansion for labor input to grow more rapidly than can be explained by
230 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
21. Sims (1974).
22. As in Gordon (1993).
23. For a formal deﬁnition of stationarity and cointegration, see Engle and Granger
(1987, pp. 252–53).
24. A complete taxonomy of the possible forms of dynamic speciﬁcation in a bivariate
model is presented in Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan (1984, pp. 1040–49).
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expansion” (EOE) effect and argued that it was balanced by a tendency to
underhire in the ﬁrst two years or so after the end of the expansion. The
dynamics of the EOE effect reﬂect overoptimistic forecasts and overhir-
ing as the economy’s growth slows and ﬁnally halts at the end of an
expansion, causing a squeeze on proﬁts, followed by cost cutting, layoffs,
and a reluctance to hire workers in the recession and ﬁrst stages of the
recovery. 
Although originally developed to explain cyclical productivity behav-
ior, the same phenomenon should show up in equations for some or all of
the labor market variables. If overhiring holds productivity down at the
end of expansions, that same overhiring should be evident in some com-
bination of the employment rate, the LFPR, hours per employee, and per-
haps even the mix and payroll-household employment ratio terms. It is
particularly interesting to reassess the EOE effect in light of the apparent
change in cyclical behavior of productivity since the mid-1980s previ-
ously discussed in connection with table 3. 
The EOE effect is introduced into the dynamic speciﬁcation through a
set of seven dummy variables, corresponding to seven EOE episodes
since 1955. These are not conventional dummies that take values of zero
or 1; rather they are in the form 1/M and 1/N, where M is the length in
quarters of the initial interval of excessive labor input growth, and N the
length of the subsequent correction. By forcing the sum of the coefﬁcients
on each variable to equal zero, any overhiring in the initial phase is subse-
quently corrected. Overhiring that is not balanced by subsequent under-
hiring will result in a small and insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient on the EOE
dummy and will come out either in the equation’s residual or in the coef-
ﬁcients on other variables.
In my 1993 paper I determined the dating of the EOE dummies by
referring to the distinction between the business cycle as determined by
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the growth
cycle. According to the NBER deﬁnition, an expansion ends when real
output reaches its absolute peak. This can be distinguished from the ear-
lier peak of the growth cycle, which occurs when output reaches its high-
est level relative to trend or potential output. My 1993 paper set the ﬁrst M
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of the NBER cycle. The timing and duration, N, of the subsequent correc-
tion period is determined by examining residuals in equations that omit
the dummies entirely. The amplitude of the EOE effect is allowed to dif-
fer across business cycles by allowing the dummy variable for each cycle
to have its own coefﬁcient; subsequently I test whether these coefﬁcients
can be pooled into a single coefﬁcient.26
Combining these explanatory variables, the basic equation to be esti-
mated for the components of the output identity is
where Dk = 0 in all quarters except the EOE and subsequent correction
period, which are as listed in table A2 in appendix A. Here the αi are the
coefﬁcients on the lagged dependent variable; the βj are the current and
lagged coefﬁcients on the change in the real GDP deviation from trend; φ
is the coefﬁcient on the error correction term; and the γk are the coefﬁcients
on the EOE dummies. The γk coefﬁcients are interpreted according to
which dependent variable is being explained; labor market variables such
as hours of labor input or the employment rate would be expected to have
a positive EOE coefﬁcient, whereas a regression with productivity as the
dependent variable would be expected to have a negative coefﬁcient.
Estimation for Six Components of the Output Identity
The results from estimating equation 7 are presented in tables 4 and 5.
First, table 4 presents results for ﬁve of the identity components, that is,
all of them except for productivity and population. Regressions for popu-
lation are omitted because there is no reason to expect the working-age
population to respond cyclically to changes in output, and indeed prelim-
inary testing indicated no response, with adjusted R2s in the vicinity of
0.01. Regressions for productivity are treated in table 5 and are given spe-
cial attention, in view of the topical interest in the performance of produc-
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26. Gordon (1993, p. 291, notes 33 and 34) discusses several arbitrary choices that
were made in carrying out this deﬁnition of the M quarters. This paper takes the deﬁnition
of the EOE dummies from Gordon (1993), with a few minor changes of a quarter more or
less. The M quarters for the late 1980s are identical to the “early” EOE dummy discussed in
Gordon (1993, p. 300).
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Hours per  ment Mix  ment 
Independent variable employeeb rate LFPR effectc ratioc
Lagged dependent  –0.17 –0.23 0.18 –0.73** –0.09
variabled
Output deviation from  0.29** 0.50** –0.00 –0.32** 0.16**
trendd




1954–58 0.51 1.18** 0.11 0.33 1.30*
1059–62 0.42 0.19 0.85 0.64 –0.24
1968–71 0.74 0.97** 0.77 0.96 0.84
1973–76 0.73 1.30** 0.67 0.30 0.40
1978–83 –0.23 0.58 0.90 1.11* 0.51
1988–92 0.90 0.55 0.88 0.74 0.65
2000–03 –0.07 0.56 0.62 0.72 1.19*
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.73 0.14 0.42 0.16
Standard error of  1.02 0.79 1.02 1.21 1.28
estimate
Sum of squared residuals  180 108 180 255 287
Addendum: all EOEs are 
constrained to be equal
EOE 0.39** 0.75** 0.67** 0.67** 0.73**
Summary statistics:
Standard error of  1.01 0.79 1.00 1.20 1.28
estimate
Sum of squared residuals 185 112 182 257 294
Source: Author’s regressions using equation 7 in the text and data from sources and methods described in appendix A.
a. * indicates coefﬁcient or sum of coefﬁcients is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at the
1 percent level.
b. Data are for the nonfarm private business sector.
c. Deﬁned as in table 1.
d. Four lags are used.
e. Lagged log ratio of actual to trend of the dependent variable.
f. Values of the variables are in the form 1/M or 1/N, where M is the length in quarters of the initial interval of excessive labor
input growth, and N the length of the subsequent correction. See appendix A.
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if one is to make projections of potential GDP growth over the next two
decades.
The ﬁve dependent variables are each expressed as in equation 7 as the
ﬁrst difference of a log ratio of the actual value to the trend value. The
coefﬁcients are presented in rows corresponding to their order in equa-
tion 7, and the bottom three lines of the table provide alternative estimates
(and summary statistics) of the γk coefﬁcients for the EOE effect that
impose the constraint that all of these seven coefﬁcients are equal.
Let us start with the employment rate results in the second column of
table 4. The sum of coefﬁcients on the output deviation is 0.50, substan-
tially above the 0.39-percentage-point effect reported in the bottom line
of table 3. The error correction term has the expected negative sign, indi-
cating that a high value of the lagged ratio of the employment rate to its
trend tends to push down the growth rate of the employment rate relative
to its trend. All of the EOE coefﬁcients have the expected positive sign,
and three are highly signiﬁcant, indicating that the employment rate was
pushed up by overhiring in the late stages of expansion in 1955–57,
1968–69, and 1973–74 but was then pushed down by underhiring. 
Scanning across the other four columns reveals a strong positive
response of hours per employee and of the payroll-to-household employ-
ment ratio, and a strong negative response of the mix effect to cyclical
output movements, but no signiﬁcant response of the LFPR. All the error
correction terms in these columns are signiﬁcant, with the expected nega-
tive sign, except for the mix effect. Only scattered individual EOE coefﬁ-
cients are signiﬁcant. However, when the EOE coefﬁcients are forced to
be equal, as at the bottom of the table, they are all signiﬁcant and have the
expected positive sign. I return to the implications of the EOE coefﬁcients
in table 4 after looking at the productivity results in table 5. 
Dynamic Equations for Aggregate Hours and Productivity
In my previous papers,27 empirical equations did not explain labor pro-
ductivity changes themselves but rather took the quarterly change in the
log ratio of actual to trend aggregate hours of work as the dependent vari-
able. Recall that, in the notation of equation 2 above, output per hour is
QB/AB. The denominator is aggregate hours of work, that is, NFPB employ-
234 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
27. Gordon (1979, 1993).
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equations explaining aggregate hours and compare the results with those in
my 1993 paper but also estimate symmetric equations that explain the
quarterly change in the log ratio of actual to trend output per hour.
A familiar aspect of productivity dynamics is that AB responds with a
lag to cyclical movements in QB, and this lagged adjustment of AB implies
that productivity, the ratio QB/AB, leads output movements. Although it is
no problem to run a regression for productivity change with the speciﬁca-
tion of equation 7 in which leads on the output deviation term replace
lags, this has the practical disadvantage that it prevents one from estimat-
ing the equation or providing residuals that cover a period of great inter-
est, namely, the four quarters ending in 2003:2. In order to estimate
productivity equations that can provide predicted values and residuals for
these ﬁnal four quarters, one can omit the leading values of the output
deviation variable and include only the current value, or the current value
along with several lags. As in table 4, the explanatory variables include
four lags on the dependent variable, the current and four leads or lags on
the change in the output deviation, and the error correction term deﬁned
as the lagged log ratio of actual to trend productivity. Since one would
expect above-trend productivity to stimulate hiring, the error correction
term should have a positive coefﬁcient when aggregate hours is the
dependent variable, and a negative coefﬁcient when productivity itself is
the dependent variable.28
Column 5-1 of table 5 reproduces results from my 1993 paper for a
sample period ending in 1992:4.29 These are then compared in column 5-2
with the results for the same sample period and speciﬁcation using cur-
rently available data. The coefﬁcients in the ﬁrst two columns should dif-
fer only as a result of data revisions in the intervening decade. These data
revisions have indeed introduced several changes in the results. They
have made the data more noisy, as indicated by the deterioration in good-
ness of ﬁt. The sum of the coefﬁcients on the lagged dependent variable
and on the output deviation becomes larger in absolute value, and the
error correction term, although also larger, is still insigniﬁcant. The EOE
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28. Since the dependent variable in the aggregate hours equation is the change in the
log output ratio of actual to trend, a trend for aggregate hours is needed. Appendix A
describes how it is developed.
29. Gordon (1993, table 5).
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Table 5. Regressions Explaining Cyclical Deviations from Trend in Aggregate Hours
Worked and Productivitya
Dependent variable
Aggregate hours Output per hour
Independent variable 5-1b 5-2c 5-3d 5-4d 5-5d 5-6d
Lagged dependent  –0.29* –0.44** –0.32* 0.06 –0.50** –0.19
variablee
Output deviation from  0.91** 1.13** 1.07** 0.81** 0.50** 0.71**
trende
Error correction termf 0.08 0.28 0.27* 0.45** –0.36** –0.81**
End-of-expansion 
(EOE) dummy variablesg
1954–58 2.25** 3.28** 2.99** –3.75**
1959–62 1.95** 2.03* 1.92* –2.47**
1968–71 2.71** 2.82** 2.53** –4.03**
1973–76 3.24** 3.26** 2.92** –3.62**
1978–83 2.65** 0.71 0.53 –2.61**
1988–92 3.01** 2.65** 2.34** –3.39**
2000–03 1.47* –1.76*
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.66
Standard error of  1.50 1.66 1.63 1.79 1.77 2.00
estimate
Sum of squared residuals  309 366 464 581 533 706
Addendum: all EOEs 
are constrained to be
equal
EOE 2.57** 2.40** 2.02** –3.00**
Summary statistics:
Standard error of  1.49 1.68 1.65 1.77
estimate
Sum of squared residuals 389 488 550
Source: Author’s regressions using equation 7 in the text and data from sources and methods described in appendix A.
a. * indicates coefﬁcient or sum of coefﬁcients is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, ** indicates signiﬁcance at the
1 percent level. Sample period for all regressions begins in 1954:4.
b. Results reported in Gordon (1993) using then-current data through 1992:4.
c. Same speciﬁcation as in Gordon (1993) but using currently available (revised) data through 1992:4.
d. Same speciﬁcation but using currently available data through 2003:2.
e. Four lags of the dependent variable are used, except in columns 5-5 and 5-6, where four leads are used instead.
f. Lagged log ratio of actual to trend of the dependent variable.
g. Values of the variables are in the form 1/M or 1/N, where M is the length in quarters of the initial interval of excessive labor
input growth, and N the length of the subsequent correction. See appendix A.
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signiﬁcance. 
Column 5-3 extends the sample period by forty-two quarters, to
2003:2. The results change remarkably little: the coefﬁcients are about the
same, the standard error actually declines somewhat, and the EOE coefﬁ-
cient for 2000–03 provides a new example of the continued relevance of
the EOE hypothesis, ﬁrst developed almost twenty-ﬁve years ago. Col-
umn 5-4 uses an identical speciﬁcation and sample period except for the
omission of the EOE dummies, which raises the standard error of the esti-
mate from 1.63 to 1.79 and the sum of squared residuals by 25 percent. 
Column 5-5 covers the same time period as columns 5-3 and 5-4 but
switches the dependent (and the lagged dependent) variable from the
change in the hours deviation from trend to the change in the productivity
deviation from trend, still within the speciﬁcation of equation 7. The four
lags on the output deviation are replaced with four leads. The productivity
version in column 5-5 ﬁts somewhat less well than the hours version,
which is not surprising since productivity changes are more variable than
changes in hours. Comparing column 5-5 with column 5-3, one observes
that the use of labor productivity instead of hours as the dependent vari-
able raises the statistical signiﬁcance of all variables and increases the
absolute value and the signiﬁcance of all seven EOE dummy variables. As
expected, the coefﬁcients on the error correction term and the EOE dum-
mies have opposite signs in columns 5-3 and 5-5.30
How should the coefﬁcients on the output deviation be interpreted in
the hours and productivity versions? The short-run response of hours to
output is 1.07 in column 5-3, and this translates into a long-run response
of 0.81 when divided through by 1 minus the sum of coefﬁcients on the
lagged dependent variable. This, in turn, gives a response of productivity
change to output change of 1 – 0.81, or 0.19.31 The same arithmetic
implies a long-term response in column 5-5 of 0.33, and this larger
response presumably reﬂects to some extent the simultaneity of the output
and productivity variables. That is, running a regression of productivity
change on current output change creates an upward bias on the output
coefﬁcient in column 5-5. 
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30. The leads are highly signiﬁcant. The F(4,181) ratio for the inclusion of the four
leads is 6.03, compared with a 5 percent critical value of 2.42.
31. The long-run responses of 0.19 in column 5-3 and 0.33 in column 5-5 bracket the
long-run response of 0.28 reported in Gordon (1993, p. 294).
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that forces the separate EOE coefﬁcients to be identical across the six or
seven EOE episodes. In each case one cannot reject the hypothesis that all
the EOE coefﬁcients are identical, and the case for equal coefﬁcients is
strongest in column 5-5.32 A nicely symmetrical result is that when the
EOE coefﬁcients are forced to be equal for the components of the output
identity in table 4, the sum of these EOE effects across the ﬁve columns of
the table is 3.21, which is very close to, and with the opposite sign from,
the combined EOE effect on productivity of –3.00 at the bottom of col-
umn 5-5 in table 5.
How do the long-run responses of the components of the output iden-
tity to cyclical movements in output estimated in tables 4 and 5 compare
with the crude peak and trough ratios developed in table 3? These results
are brought together in table 6, which repeats the response coefﬁcients
from table 3 and both the short-run and the long-run responses derived
from tables 4 and 5, shown alternatively for the versions of the equation
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32. The F(5,138) ratio in column 5-2 is 2.06, compared with a 5 percent signiﬁcance
level of 2.27. The F(6,180) ratio in column 5-3 is 1.55, compared with a 5 percent signiﬁ-
cance level of 2.14. And the F(6,180) ratio in column 5-5 is 0.45, compared with the same
5 percent signiﬁcance level of 2.14.
Table 6. Short- and Long-Run Responses to Output Changes of Output Identity
Components, 1954:4–2003:2
From
Estimate Aa Estimate Bb
Component table 3 Short run Long runc Short run Long runc
Output per hourd 0.38 –0.07 0.19 0.50 0.33
Employment rate 0.39 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.41
Labor force participation rate 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Working-age population 0.01 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hours per employeed 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.25
Mix effect –0.19 –0.32 –0.18 –0.32 –0.18
Payroll-household 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15
employment ratio
Sum of coefﬁcients 0.99 0.56 0.82 1.13 0.96
Sources: Tables 3, 4, and 5 and author’s calculations. 
a. Estimate for the short-run response for output per hour is calculated from the coefﬁcient on output deviation from trend
from the aggregate hours equation (equation 5-3) in table 5; other short-run responses from table 4.
b. Estimate uses the coefﬁcient on output deviation from trend from the output per hour equation (equation 5-5) in table 5 for
the short-run response for output per hour; other short-run responses from table 4. Sample period ends in 2002:2.
c. Sum of coefﬁcients on the output term divided by 1 minus the sum of coefﬁcients on the lagged dependent variable.
d. For the nonfarm private business sector.
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tivity as the dependent variable (estimate B). The response coefﬁcient of
the employment rate is quite stable across the columns of table 6, varying
only from 0.39 to 0.50. Similarly, the coefﬁcient on hours per employee is
quite stable in a range of 0.23 to 0.29. Although the productivity
responses appear to be quite inconsistent across columns, the long-run
response of 0.33 in the last column of table 6 is not far from the response
of 0.38 listed in the ﬁrst column. The columns agree that the LFPR effect
is unimportant, and the mix and payroll-household employment ratio
effects taken together seem to suggest a long-run negative response of
about –0.03. 
Productivity Growth in 2000–03: Trend, Cycle, and Residual
The above analysis provides the tools to determine how much of the
rapid productivity growth since 2000 was predicted by the regression
equation and how much emerges in the unexplained residual. I examine
the results in three steps. First, ﬁgure 4 presents a plot of productivity
growth residuals. Then, table 8 below compares the behavior of actual
and predicted productivity growth in the initial 2002–03 recovery phase
with that in the early stages of six previous business cycles. Finally, table
9 reports actual and predicted changes in all the components of the output
identity over selected intervals, including 2000–03, showing to what
extent productivity residuals are balanced by residuals in the opposite
direction in other components of the output identity.
Figure 4 plots four-quarter averages of residuals from three different
versions of the regression equation as speciﬁed in table 5. The line labeled
“Aggregate hours” plots the residuals for the equation explaining the
change in the hours deviation in column 5-3 of table 5, which includes the
current value of the change in the output deviation and four lags. The ﬁg-
ure reverses the signs of the residuals in the hours equation, because a
negative residual for the change in detrended hours implies a positive
residual in the change for detrended productivity. 
The line labeled “Output per hour with lags” plots the residuals for the
equation explaining the change in the productivity deviation in table 5,
column 5-5, except that for this purpose I omit the lead terms on the out-
put deviation in order to be able to compute residuals through to the ﬁnal
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almost identical, as they should be, and indicate a tendency of the speciﬁ-
cation to underpredict actual productivity growth during 1988–93, to
overpredict it during 1994–99, and to underpredict it substantially during
2000–03. It is interesting to compare the residuals of the second equation
in the 2000–03 episode with those in the previous recession and recovery
in 1990–93. To do this I designate the recession quarters as beginning
with the output peak and extending three quarters beyond, and the recov-
ery quarters as the ﬁrst seven quarters after the trough in real GDP.
Table 7 reports the average residual during each interval for both the pro-
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33. When four leads are included as in the version shown in table 5, column 5-5, the
sample period of the regression must stop in 2002:2, one year before the end of the data.
Substituting four lags for four leads raises the sum of the squared residuals (SSR) in col-
umn 5-5 from 533 to 576, and including only the current value with no leads or lags raises
the SSR further to 604. 
Figure 4. Residuals from Productivity Growth Equations, 1985–2003a
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. All residuals are four-quarter averages.
b. Residuals from equation reported in column 5-3 of table 5 (hours is the dependent variable).
c. Residuals from equation reported in column 5-5 of table 5; leads are replaced by lags to produce values through 2003:2.











Output per hour with lagsc
Output per hour without 
2000–03 EOE effectd
Percent a year
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and the hours equation.
The residuals in the productivity and hours equations are similar to
each other in each of the four episodes. Both recessions share in common
that productivity growth was stronger than the equation can explain—
another sign of the tendency, already noted in table 3, for the behavior of
productivity to become less procyclical in the last two cyclical episodes.
The big difference in these two business cycles is that the residual in the
ﬁrst seven quarters of the 2001–03 expansion is much larger than that in
the ﬁrst seven quarters of the 1991–92 expansion. 
The line labeled “Output per hour without 2000–03 EOE effect” in ﬁg-
ure 4 displays an alternative version of the productivity equation that is
otherwise identical to the ﬁrst except that the ﬁnal EOE dummy variable
covering the 2000–03 period is omitted from the equation (the six EOE
dummies for the earlier periods are retained). The difference between the
two lines illustrates the size and timing of the estimated EOE effect in the
2000–03 episode. The full equation including the EOE effect predicts
substantially less productivity growth in 2000 and early 2001 and sub-
stantially more during 2002–03 than the equation that omits the EOE
effect, and so it has larger positive residuals in 2000–01 and smaller posi-
tive residuals in 2002–03. Intuitively, the EOE coefﬁcient  “sees” the
robust productivity growth of 2002–03, interprets that as a typical EOE
reversal impact, and—because the sum of the EOE initial and reversal
effects is constrained to be zero—it is forced to estimate a negative EOE
impact on productivity growth in the initial period 2000–01 even though
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Table 7. Average Residuals of Productivity and Hours Equations in 
Recent Cyclical Episodes
Percent








a. Residuals from equation speciﬁed as in column 5-5 of table 5 except that data are through 2003:2 and four lags of the out-
put deviation variable are substituted for four leads.
b. Residuals from equation speciﬁed as in equation 5-3 of table 5 but with data through 2003:2. 
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effect at face value, the unexplained component of productivity growth
began to take off in mid-2000, about ﬁve quarters before the take-off
became visible in the raw data. Recall that all these residuals are calcu-
lated for the deviation of productivity growth from a trend that is esti-
mated to grow at a much faster rate than the consensus among academic
economists only a few months ago: trend growth as estimated by the aver-
age of the H-P and Kalman ﬁlter results is 2.84 percent a year in 2000,
3.02 in 2001, 3.08 in 2002, and 3.05 in the ﬁrst half of 2003. 
The Early-Recovery Productivity Growth “Bubble”
Productivity growth was extremely rapid in the initial quarters after the
trough of real GDP in 2001:3. But this is nothing new. A similar period of
rapid productivity growth has been observed in the ﬁrst few quarters of
almost every postwar recovery, and in every case it has been followed by
a return of productivity growth back to trend growth or even below trend
growth in the subsequent phase of the expansion. This “early-recovery
productivity growth bubble” is consistent with the EOE effect, for in the
ﬁrst few quarters of the recovery proﬁts are still squeezed, and business
ﬁrms are aggressively attempting to cut costs by reducing labor input.
Table 8 summarizes this little-noted cyclical phenomenon. The top
panel reports, in the ﬁrst column, the average growth rate of actual pro-
ductivity relative to trend in the ﬁrst four recovery quarters after each
trough quarter for real GDP in seven cyclical recoveries going back to
1958. The bottom panel reports the same measure for the eight quarters
following the ﬁrst four quarters of the recovery. At the bottom of each
panel is the average over the seven cyclical episodes. The remaining
columns report averages over each interval of the predicted value from
the productivity regression in table 5, column 5-5; the statistical contribu-
tion of the EOE dummy variables to that prediction; the prediction minus
the EOE contribution; and ﬁnally the statistical residual. 
The bottom line in each panel of table 8 shows the averages over the
seven episodes in that panel and reveals a striking difference between the
ﬁrst four, “bubble” quarters of the average recovery and the following
eight quarters. Productivity grows, on average, 2.69 percentage points a
year faster than trend in the ﬁrst four quarters but 0.11 percentage point
slower than trend over the next eight quarters. This difference is almost
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with an average residual of only 0.32 percentage point in the ﬁrst four
quarters and an even smaller 0.09 percentage point in the subsequent
eight quarters. The predicted change in the ﬁrst four quarters is 2.37 per-
centage points compared with –0.20 percentage point in the subsequent
eight quarters. 
How does the model explain the early-recovery bubble? As shown for
the average of the ﬁrst four quarters, about two-thirds of the predicted
2.37-percentage-point early-recovery productivity growth is attributable
to the EOE reversal effect and the remaining one-third to the other vari-
ables, almost entirely the role of unusually rapid output growth in the ﬁrst
four quarters in stimulating rapid productivity growth. In the subsequent
eight quarters, the EOE reversal effect and the remaining variables work
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Change in  of EOE Predicted 
productivity effect to  value 
deviation Predicted predicted without
Episode from trend value value EOE effect Residual
First four quarters after real GDP trough
1958:2–1959:1 3.08 2.43 0.01 2.42 0.65
1961:1–1961:4 3.89 3.90 1.24 2.66 –0.01
1971:1–1971:4 0.67 0.99 2.69 –1.69 –0.32
1975:2–1976:2 2.77 3.57 2.07 1.50 –0.80
1983:1–1983:4 3.22 3.14 2.61 0.53 0.08
1991:2–1992:1 2.43 1.81 1.70 0.11 0.62
2001:4–2002:3a 2.79 0.77 1.01 –0.23 2.02
Average 2.69 2.37 1.62 0.76 0.32
Next eight quarters
1959:2–1961:1 –1.61 –1.17 –0.82 –0.35 –0.44
1962:1–1963:4 0.46 0.01 1.24 –1.23 0.45
1972:1–1973:4 0.72 –0.50 –2.07 1.57 1.21
1976:2–1978:1 –0.40 –0.94 2.07 –3.01 0.55
1984:1–1984:4 0.11 0.98 . . . . . . –0.87
1992:2–1994:1 –0.51 0.51 1.70 –1.19 –1.02
2002:4–2003:2a 0.46 –0.29 1.01 –1.30 0.75
Average –0.11 –0.20 0.52 –0.92 0.09
Source: Regression estimates in table 5, column 5-5.
a. Results are based on same regression reestimated with leading values omitted and only the current value of the output devi-
ation included.
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growth, while slower output growth and the error correction term both
hold down productivity growth relative to trend.
This history of cyclical recoveries puts the 2001–03 productivity per-
formance into perspective. Relative to trend, the early take-off of actual
productivity growth in the ﬁrst four quarters after the GDP trough in
2001:3 was not unusual and in fact was roughly equal to the average in
the previous six episodes. What was unusual is that the productivity equa-
tion could not explain most of this growth, and the residual for the ﬁrst
four quarters was 2.02 percentage points compared with an average of
0.32 percentage point. The estimated EOE effect was smaller in 2001–03,
and actual real GDP growth was slower than trend, holding down pre-
dicted productivity growth. As measured by the residuals, the initial four
quarters (2001:4–2002:3) were more unusual in historical context than the
ﬁnal three quarters. As noted previously, these comments on deviations
from trend growth must be evaluated in the context of a robust trend
slightly above 3.0 percent a year, which is even faster than the previous
peak of trend growth in 1961–62.34
Labor Market Counterparts of Rapid Productivity Growth
Economists have marveled at the productivity growth data examined
above, but their counterpart through mid-2003, a continual erosion of
payroll employment, was a source of despair for many households, not to
mention incumbent politicians. A virtue of the output identity used here is
that one can use it to trace the unusual strength of productivity growth to
unusual weakness in other elements of the identity. Table 9 does this for
three subperiods: early 1985 to late 1995, late 1995 to mid-2000, and mid-
2000 to mid-2003. All elements of the identity are listed in the same order
as in table 3, and the ﬁnal column sums the right-hand-side variables of
equations 2 and 3. 
Some of the special aspects of the past three years were already
revealed in table 3, which examined the ratio of actual to trend behavior
for these same eight variables. Now the statistical evidence presented
above can be added in the form of predicted values and residuals, thus
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34. The trend growth rate of productivity during the four quarters of 1961 was 2.95 per-
cent a year; the fastest rate recorded by my technique was between mid-1948 and mid-
1949, when it reached 3.15 percent a year.
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Percent
Payroll-
Output Hours household Sum  of 
per per  Employment Working-age Mix  employment  last  seven
Episode Real GDP houra employeeb rate LFPR population effect ratio columns
1987:1–1995:4
Actual 2.71 1.45 –0.07 0.13 0.19 1.08 –0.44 0.38 2.71
Trend 2.77 1.59 –0.04 0.04 0.23 1.13 –0.43 0.24 2.74
Ratio of actual to trend –0.06 –0.14 –0.03 0.09 –0.04 –0.05 –0.01 0.08 –0.03
Predicted ratio . . . 0.21 –0.04 –0.01 –0.18 . . . 0.06 –0.03 0.12
Residual . . . –0.35 –0.07 0.10 0.13 . . . –0.07 0.11 –0.15
1995:4–2000:2 
Actual 4.20 2.56 –0.04 0.38 0.22 1.29 –0.71 0.49 4.20
Trend 3.28 2.35 –0.17 0.12 0.04 1.24 –0.70 0.37 3.27
Ratio of actual to trend 0.92 0.21 0.13 0.26 0.18 0.05 –0.01 0.21 0.93
Predicted ratio . . . 0.69 –0.19 0.36 –0.25 . . . –0.09 0.06 0.54
Residual . . . –0.48 0.32 –0.11 0.43 . . . 0.08 0.15 0.39
2000:2–2003:2 
Actual 1.50 3.46 –0.83 –0.78 –0.37 1.21 –0.68 –0.51 1.50
Trend 3.39 3.03 –0.42 0.04 –0.03 1.22 –0.65 0.19 3.38
Ratio of actual to trend –1.89 0.43 –0.41 –0.82 –0.34 –0.01 –0.03 –0.81 –1.88
Predicted ratio . . . –0.75 –0.36 –0.79 –0.08 . . . 0.37 –0.68 –2.19
Residual . . . 1.18 –0.05 –0.03 –0.26 . . . 0.40 –0.13 0.31
Source: Author’s calculations; see appendix A.
a. Predicted values and residuals are from regressions reported in table 5, column 5-5, with four lags on the output deviation variable substituted for four leads. Output per hour data are for the non-
farm private business sector. Predicted values and residuals for other columns (except working-age population) are from the regressions reported in table 4.













































5allowing a determination of how much of the observed change in the
actual-to-trend ratio for each variable was normal cyclical behavior and
how much was surprising in a historical context. To focus ﬁrst on the bot-
tom panel of table 9, the startling event of the past three years was that
real GDP grew 1.89 percentage points a year slower than trend, whereas
productivity growth grew 0.43 percentage point a year faster than its own
accelerating trend. Balancing this differential was the fact that all the
other components of the identity grew slower than trend; in order of size:
the employment rate (–0.82 percentage point), the payroll-to-household
employment ratio (–0.81 percentage point), hours per employee (–0.41
percentage point), the LFPR (–0.34 percentage point), and the mix effect
(–0.03 percentage point). 
My econometric analysis balances its large positive residual in
explaining productivity growth relative to trend with a large negative
residual on the mix effect and smaller negative residuals on the LFPR and
the payroll-to-household employment ratio. In trying to understand the
recent period, it is helpful to combine the mix and employment ratio
effects; as in equation 2, these two effects when multiplied together
become the ratio of real GDP per household employee to the ratio of
NFPB output to NFPB payroll employees. The sum of the growth rates of
these two effects is a change in the actual-to-trend ratio of –0.84 percent-
age point a year, with a predicted value of –0.31 percentage point and a
residual of –0.53 percentage point. An examination of the components of
these ratios suggests that the main issue is the behavior of payroll employ-
ment rather than the ratio of real GDP to NFPB output.35
This section has emphasized the unusual behavior of productivity
growth relative to estimated trend productivity growth in the period
2000–03 and its counterpart in slow growth in hours of work. But produc-
tivity and hours were not the only unusual aspects of the post-1995 U.S.
economy. Notably different from past business cycles was the unusual
decline in the rate of capacity utilization from 83.6 percent in 1995 to
82.7 percent in 2000, during a period when the ratio of real GDP to trend
246 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
35. I have estimated a trend for the ratio Q/QB, which is steadily negative at a rate of
about –0.4 percent a year over the past decade. This ratio is strongly countercyclical, since
NFPB output declines relative to real GDP in recessions and in the early stages of recover-
ies. The cyclical increase in this ratio in 2001–02 was typical, indicating that the counter-
part of unusual productivity behavior was unusual behavior of employment, not of the
Q/QB ratio.
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lower than in any year since 1983, despite the much lower ratio of real
GDP to trend in the earlier year (–6.2 percent compared with –1.8 percent
in 2002). Linking the behavior of capacity utilization with that of produc-
tivity is the common theme of rapidly rising capacity to produce ICT
investment. I now turn to the substantive puzzles posed by recent produc-
tivity behavior, in which ICT investment plays a central role.
Explanations of Rapid Productivity Growth in 2000–03
The second major task of this paper is to examine possible substantive
explanations for the post-2000 productivity growth acceleration. The two
most compelling hypotheses are, ﬁrst, that an unusual degree of down-
ward pressure on proﬁts led to unusually aggressive cost cutting by ﬁrms,
and second, that intangible capital acted as a source of dynamic adjust-
ment in the response of productivity growth to a boom in ICT capital
investment. The need to accumulate intangible capital in order to realize
the potential of ICT investment can result in a delay of several years in the
productivity beneﬁts of that investment. It can also cause mismeasure-
ment of the timing of productivity growth that contributes to explaining
some of the post-2000 productivity growth acceleration. After examining
these hypotheses, I assess several less important substantive issues,
including outsourcing and changes in the structure of labor markets, as
well as the hypotheses that payroll employment, hours per employee, or
both, have been mismeasured to an unusual extent during the last few
years. 
Cost Cutting and the Proﬁt Squeeze
Both productivity and proﬁts are leading indicators. Because of lags in
hiring and ﬁring, productivity growth leads output, surging when output is
growing rapidly and then slowing down as labor input catches up to out-
put in the typical expansion. Late in the expansion, output growth slows,
but overly optimistic expectations may lead ﬁrms to continue adding to
labor input during this late-expansion slow-growth period, thus reducing
productivity growth to a smaller positive or even a negative rate. Although
some of this typical cyclical dynamic is captured by the adjustment lags in
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the output identity, the tendency to overhire in the last stages of the
expansion goes beyond the simple dynamics of lagged coefﬁcients on
output changes, and this is what is captured by the EOE dummy variables
discussed above.
Proﬁts are related to productivity through the income shares of labor
and capital. By deﬁnition, labor’s share is equal to real compensation per
hour divided by output per hour. If increases in compensation lag behind
productivity in the early phases of a cyclical expansion, labor’s share will
decline and capital’s share will rise, and the rate of return on capital will
rise even faster to the extent that the rising utilization of capital causes an
increase in capital productivity.36 The cyclical expansion of the 1990s
exhibited behavior typical of corporate proﬁts as measured in the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which registered a near doubling
of nominal proﬁts between 1992 and 1997 followed by a decline between
mid-1997 and early 2000, a slight further decline into 2001, and then a
recovery in 2002 and early 2003 back to the 1997 nominal peak and
beyond.37
William Nordhaus contrasts the behavior of NIPA proﬁts with that of
S&P reported proﬁts, which show a very different timing pattern, growing
by 70 percent between early 1998 and early 2000 and then declining by
more than half between early 2000 and early 2001.38 He attributes a sub-
stantial role in this “most unusual pattern” to a wide variety of shady
accounting tricks to which corporations turned as they desperately
attempted to pump up reported proﬁts during 1998–2000 in an environ-
ment in which true proﬁts were declining. In Nordhaus’s words, these
tricks led to the “enrichment of the few and depleted pension plans of the
248 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
36. To be explicit, one can write W as the nominal wage rate, A as aggregate hours of
work, R as nominal proﬁt per unit of capital, K as the number of units of real capital, P for
the GDP deﬂator, and Q for real GDP. When productivity (Q/A) grows faster than real
compensation per hour (W/P), the share of labor (WA/PQ) declines while the share of cap-
ital (RK/PQ) rises. If rising capital utilization increases the productivity of capital (Q/K),
then by deﬁnition the real rate of return (R/P) must rise more rapidly than capital’s income
share. 
37. Nominal corporate proﬁts after tax with inventory valuation and capital consump-
tion adjustments were $309.9 billion in 1992, $596.6 billion in 1997, $528.7 billion in
2000, and $532.3 billion in 2001, recovering to $662.7 billion in 2003:2 (Economic Report
of the President, February 2003, table B-90, p. 381, column 3, and www.bea.doc.gov/bea/
newsrel/gdp203f.xls).
38. Nordhaus (2002a).
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of S&P reported earnings to S&P operating earnings, primarily due to the
one-time charges that ﬁrms take to correct for previous business or
accounting mistakes. Overall, Nordhaus estimates that reported S&P
earnings for 2001 were held down by about 30 percent by a combination
of normal cyclical and extraordinary accounting impacts.
The unusual trajectory of S&P reported proﬁts in 1998–2001 placed
unusual pressure on corporate managers to cut costs and reduce employ-
ment. During the 1990s corporate compensation had shifted to relying
substantially on stock options, leading ﬁrst to the temptation to engage in
accounting tricks during 1998–2000 to maintain the momentum of earn-
ings growth, and then sheer desperation to cut costs in response to the
post-2000 collapse in reported S&P earnings and in the stock market. The
stock market collapse had an independent impact on the pressure for
corporate cost cutting, beyond its effect on the stock-option portion of
executive compensation, by shifting many corporate-sponsored deﬁned-
beneﬁt pension plans from overfunded to underfunded status. 
A plausible interpretation of the unusual upsurge of productivity
growth in 2002–03, then, is that it was the counterpart of an unusual
degree of pressure for corporate cost cutting, in turn caused by the role of
accounting scandals and corporate write-offs that led to the unusual tra-
jectory of reported S&P proﬁts relative to NIPA proﬁts. The unusual
nature of recent corporate cost cutting has been widely recognized. As the
Wall Street Journal put it:
The mildness of the recession masked a ferocious corporate-proﬁts crunch that
has many chief executives still slashing jobs and other costs. . . . Many CEOs
were so traumatized by last year’s proﬁts debacle that they are paring costs
rather than planning plant expansions.39
This chain of causation from the proﬁts “debacle” to the 2002–03 produc-
tivity surge seems plausible as the leading explanation of the unusual pro-
ductivity behavior documented in previous sections. But it raises a central
question: How were corporate managers able to maintain output growth
while cutting costs so savagely? Why didn’t the massive layoffs cause
output to fall, as it would have if productivity growth had stagnated? This
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nies; Nervous CEOs Could Slow Recovery by Continuing Layoffs, Plant Closings,” Wall
Street Journal, April 1, 2002, p. A1.
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ity growth revival and to the puzzle of explaining how productivity
growth surged after 2000 even as ICT investment growth was collapsing
along with corporate proﬁts and the stock market. 
Why Did Productivity Growth Accelerate 
after 2000 While ICT Investment Collapsed?
As shown above, productivity growth after mid-2000 was substantially
more rapid than during the initial revival period of 1995–2000. Studies of
the initial 1995–99 productivity revival period, most notably those of
Dale Jorgenson and Kevin Stiroh, and Stephen Oliner and Daniel Sichel,40
attributed a large fraction of that revival to the production and the use of
ICT equipment and software. In the case of Oliner and Sichel, the analy-
sis included not only ICT capital, including software, but also the semi-
conductors that powered the hardware. This leads us to the paradox that
productivity growth proceeded to a second stage of acceleration during
2000–03 just as the ICT investment boom collapsed.
Data on real investment in computers and other products with rapid rel-
ative price changes become increasingly more misleading as time extends
past the base year in the NIPA, currently 1996. To avoid potential errors
of interpretation, the correct measure of the importance of ICT investment
is the nominal share of that particular type of investment in nominal GDP.
For computer hardware, that share averaged 0.96 percent in 1997–2000
but then crashed to 0.71 percent in 2002 and by 2003:2 had recovered
only to 0.77 percent. A more comprehensive measure that includes not
just computer hardware but also software and “other” (mainly communi-
cations) equipment registered an average GDP share of 4.23 percent in
1997–2000, reaching 4.55 percent in 2000, and then fell to 3.83 percent in
2002 before recovering to 3.94 percent in 2003:2.
The Oliner-Sichel Decomposition
The most inﬂuential research supporting a large role for ICT invest-
ment in the post-1995 productivity growth revival appears in a series of
papers by Oliner and Sichel (O-S).41 Their approach, presented in
250 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
40. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000); Oliner and Sichel (2000).
41. Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002).
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distinguish the role of deepening of ICT capital (third line of table 10), that
is, the beneﬁts of rapid ICT investment to the users of ICT capital, from
that of the production of ICT capital in raising the growth rate of total fac-
tor productivity (TFP) for the economy as a whole (tenth line). It is easy
to follow the changes in the O-S results as new data emerge, because they
are always presented in the same format, and because the same initial time
period (growth rates from 1973 to 1995) is compared with the revival
period (1995 to the latest year for which data are available).
Table 10 compares the initial (2000) O-S decomposition with their lat-
est unpublished results, which extend the ﬁndings to 2002.42 The table
ﬁrst reports the growth rate of labor productivity and then subtracts the
contributions of capital deepening and improvements in labor quality
(education) to arrive at the growth rate of TFP. The capital deepening
component is further subdivided into ICT and other capital and into three
types of ICT capital. The resulting TFP growth rate is then decomposed
into the role of the production of ICT capital and that of all other contri-
butions to TFP growth. 
Finally, table 10 adds two lines to the standard O-S decomposition.
The two types of ICT capital contribution, ICT capital deepening and the
TFP effect, can be added together, as is done in the next to last line of the
table. Then the total ICT contribution can be divided by the growth rate of
labor productivity, from the ﬁrst line of the table, to yield the total contri-
bution of ICT capital to productivity growth and to the productivity
revival, as shown in the last line of the table. Table 10 shows three differ-
ent decompositions of the post-1995 productivity growth revival. The
ﬁrst, using data through 1999 (ﬁrst three columns), is taken from the ini-
tial O-S paper, and the second uses the latest (revised) data for the same
period (second three columns). Data revisions reduce the overall produc-
tivity revival while leaving the ICT contribution intact, and this boosts the
contribution of ICT capital to the 1995–99 revival from 81 percent to
98 percent. 
The third decomposition extends the endpoint of the data from 1999 to
2002 (last two columns of table 10). The revival in the growth rate of
labor productivity increases from 0.96 to 1.20 percentage points, while
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results are of greatest interest.
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Percent
Original O-S estimates (2000) Latest O-S estimates (2003)
Change, Change, Change, 
1973–95 to  1973–95 to  1973–95 to
Component 1973–95 1995–99 1995–99 1973–95 1995–99 1995–99 1995–2002 1995–2002
Labor productivity growth  1.41 2.57 1.16 1.41 2.36 0.96 2.61 1.20
Contributions from:
Capital deepening 0.77 1.10 0.33 0.72 0.98 0.26 1.20 0.49
ICT capital 0.46 0.96 0.50 0.42 0.95 0.53 0.93 0.51
Computer hardware 0.25 0.59 0.34 0.22 0.52 0.31 0.47 0.25
Software 0.12 0.27 0.15 0.12 0.33 0.20 0.33 0.21
Communications equipment 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.05
Other capital 0.31 0.14 –0.17 0.30 0.03 –0.26 0.27 –0.02
Labor quality 0.27 0.31 0.04 0.27 0.30 0.03 0.25 –0.02
Total factor productivity 0.36 1.16 0.80 0.42 0.98 0.56 1.15 0.74
Of which contributed by:
ICT and semiconductors 0.22 0.66 0.44 0.30 0.72 0.41 0.70 0.40
Other nonfarm business 0.15 0.50 0.35 0.11 0.26 0.15 0.45 0.34
Memorandum: Total contribution 
of ICT and semiconductors
a 0.67 1.62 0.95 0.72 1.66 0.94 1.63 0.91
As share of total change in  47.93 63.04 81.29 51.55 70.37 98.01 62.62 75.53
labor productivity
Sources: Oliner and Sichel (2000, tables 2 and 4); data provided by Daniel Sichel, Federal Reserve Board, to the author.













































2the total contribution of ICT capital shows surprisingly little response to
the decline in ICT investment discussed above. As a result, the contribu-
tion of ICT capital declines from 98 percent in the period ending in 1999
to 76 percent in the period ending in 2002.43 The spurt in productivity
growth from 1999 to 2002 is more than explained by capital deepening in
“other capital” and more rapid TFP growth contributed by sectors of the
economy other than ICT and semiconductor capital. The puzzling
absence of a decline in the ICT contribution as well as the upsurge in
“other” capital deepening can both be traced to the same cause: the rapid
decline in hours of labor input in 2001–02. Since all the capital deepening
terms in table 10 represent the change in a capital-labor ratio times an
income share of that type of capital, the apparent resilience of the ICT role
disguises the fact that the ICT contribution by itself fell by half between
2000 and 2002, but this is dampened by the rapid decline in labor input.
Delay and Intangible (“Hidden”) Capital
Drawing back from the details of table 10, one can take a broader view
of the claim that, at least through 1999, virtually all of the productivity
growth revival can be attributed to the production and use of ICT capital.
This ﬁnding seems compatible with numerous studies, especially those of
Jack Triplett and Barry Bosworth and of Nordhaus,44 which pinpoint
wholesale and retail trade and securities trading as the industries outside
of ICT manufacturing where the productivity growth revival is most evi-
dent. In these analyses the largest single contribution to the revival is
deepening in ICT capital, and this is precisely the capital that has been
used so effectively in trade and securities trading.
Nevertheless, several questions may be raised about the implication of
table 10 that the post-1995 productivity revival, at least through 1999,
resulted entirely from increased production and use of ICT equipment.45
The O-S technique requires that the full productivity payoff from the use
43. Data revisions released on August 7, 2003, would further reduce the ICT share of
the 1995–2002 revival from 76 percent to 67 percent, allowing only for the revisions in
labor productivity and assuming no revisions for any other ﬁgure in the ﬁnal column of
table 9. 
44. Triplett and Bosworth (2002); Nordhaus (2002b).
45. One of the interim versions of the O-S decomposition went through an endpoint of
2001 and concluded that ICT capital overexplained the revival when dated as 1995–2001
(see Sichel’s discussion of Nordhaus, 2002b).
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Assuming no delay between production and installation, the computer
produces its ultimate productivity beneﬁt on the ﬁrst day of use. Numer-
ous observers, led by Paul David,47 argue instead that there is in fact a
substantial delay in reorganizing business practices to take advantage of
new hardware and software. If the O-S method fails to take such delay
into account, it will exaggerate the contribution of ICT capital deepening
to the post-1995 revival during the years of peak ICT investment. Then, in
the period 2001–03 when ICT investment has declined, it will understate
the contribution of ICT capital by omitting the delayed beneﬁts from pre-
vious ICT investment. This would lead the method to understate the
acceleration of TFP growth in the years of peak ICT investment and to
overstate it during the period of declining ICT investment.
David’s delay hypothesis was based on a very general analogy between
the invention of electricity and computers. Since his contribution was
written, electricity, the internal combustion engine, and computers—the
three major inventions of the last 125 years that have wide and varied uses
across industries—have been christened “general purpose technolo-
gies.”48 They have in common that they require complementary inven-
tions and business reorganization to become fully effective. It took forty
years for electricity to make a major impact on manufacturing productiv-
ity, because factories had to be reorganized and machines reduced in size
to bring power to the individual workstation. The internal combustion
engine required massive investment in highways and airports to reach its
full productivity-raising potential. The role of business reorganization
and process improvement in the form of “intangible capital” that is com-
plementary to ICT investment has been the focus of recent interpreta-
tions of the post-1995 productivity growth revival by Susanto Basu and
coauthors (Basu, Fernald, Oulton, and Srinivasan, B-F-O-S) and by
Shinkyu Yang and Erik Brynjolfsson (Y-B).49 Both groups of authors
argue that measured investments in computer hardware and software
254 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
46. Recall that the GDP statistics on which they rely measure output by production and
treat any unsold goods as inventory accumulation, a part of GDP.
47. David (1990).
48. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995).
49. Basu and others (forthcoming); Yang and Brynjolfsson (2001). A precursor to the
B-F-O-S paper is Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001). A follow-up to the Y-B paper is Bryn-
jolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002). An early version of the Y-B hypothesis is presented in
Brynjolfsson and Yang (1997). 
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including business reorganization, new business processes, retraining,
and general acquisition of human capital. The direction of mismeasure-
ment is the same as implied by the delay hypothesis for the O-S estimates:
it overstates the extent of the productivity growth revival between 1995
and 2000 but understates it afterward. 
The intangible capital hypothesis is intriguing, because it offers a pos-
sible explanation of the puzzling second acceleration of productivity
growth after 2000, in the wake of the collapse in the ICT investment
boom. Intangible capital is complementary to ICT and contributes to mea-
sured output. However, net intangible investment, which builds intangible
capital, leads to an understatement of current-period output, because it is
not counted in measured output even though the factor inputs required to
produce it are counted. When the share of intangible investment is con-
stant, this means that the amount of output credited to other, tangible fac-
tors and to total factor productivity is overstated by the percentage of
output devoted to intangible investment, but there is little effect on
growth rates or on the allocation of growth between factor inputs and
TFP. However, when the share of output devoted to intangible investment
is changing, the effect on measured productivity and its growth rate can
be dramatic. A 1-percentage-point increase in the share of output devoted
to intangible investment, say, from 3 to 4 percent, reduces measured out-
put relative to total output almost point for point. If this increase takes one
year, measured output growth is biased downward by 1 percentage point
for one year; if it takes ﬁve years, the growth rate bias is one-ﬁfth as large,
or 0.2 percent a year. 
How large might these hypothesized measurement effects be? As a
rough approximation, assume that intangible ICT investment is of about
the same magnitude as measured ICT investment. The ratio of total mea-
sured ICT investment to nominal GDP rose from 3.54 percent in 1995:3
to 4.59 percent in 2000:3 before falling back by about half its previous
increase, to 4.01 percent in 2003:3. For a narrower concept of ICT invest-
ment, one that includes only computer hardware and software and
excludes communications equipment, photocopiers, and other ofﬁce
equipment, the investment shares in these same periods were 2.03, 2.81,
and 2.57 percent. (It is interesting that this burst of growth in the ICT
share in the late 1990s was not unprecedented: the share of total ICT
investment increased from 2.01 percent of nominal GDP to 2.98 percent
Robert J. Gordon 255
1790-03_Gordon.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 255between 1978:1 and 1983:4.) To calculate the effects on the measurement
of output and productivity, however, we need the growth in real rather
than nominal investment. Over 1995–2000, tangible real ICT investment
grew at a 17.7 percent average annual rate, or 13.7 percentage points
faster than real GDP. With a 4 percent average share of ICT in GDP dur-
ing the period, this implies that the (unmeasured) share of real intangible
investment was increasing by 0.5 to 0.6 percentage point a year, and
hence annual growth of GDP and productivity were understated by the
same amount. Using the narrower deﬁnition of ICT investment, with its
annual growth rate of 22.5 percent and average nominal GDP share of
2.4 percent, gives a similar estimate. During 2000–03 this understatement
of output and productivity would have been reversed, although only in
part, since an understatement would be expected for the entire 1995–2003
period when the ICT share rose. Thus the hypothesized effects, even if
realistic, could account for only a part of the surprising recent strength in
productivity. It is worth noting that these effects are not evidence for or
against various hypotheses about delays in realizing the beneﬁts of ICT
investment, which simply assert that the contribution to output is not fully
realized at the time the measured investment is made.  
The Y-B hypothesis has implications for earlier years as well. The
share of spending on computer hardware was growing rapidly, particu-
larly during 1972–87, the interval that led Robert Solow to utter his
famous quip, which later became known as the Solow paradox, that “we
see the computer age everywhere except in the productivity statistics.”
Going beyond the speciﬁc restrictions imposed by particular models, the
role of delayed beneﬁts from the rapid growth in ICT investment in the
late 1990s seems incontrovertible. Jeffrey R. Immelt, chief executive ofﬁ-
cer of General Electric, refers to the delayed beneﬁts of ICT spending by
saying, “It takes one, two, three years to get down the learning curve and
ﬁgure out new ways to use it.” Cisco CEO John Chambers estimates the
learning curve at more like ﬁve to seven years.50
256 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
50. Quotes from Peter Coy with Timothy J. Mullaney, “Still Getting Stronger,” Busi-
ness Week, September 15, 2003, pp. 32–35. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (forthcoming) ﬁnd evi-
dence of a delay in computer effects on ﬁrm-level productivity, and Bresnahan,
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) ﬁnd direct evidence of large, time-consuming organizational
investments that complement computer investments on production functions.
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In this section I consider brieﬂy two other suggestions regarding struc-
tural changes over the past few years that could have explained some of
the upsurge in productivity growth. These include outsourcing and sev-
eral changes in labor markets that may increase ﬂexibility and reduce the
barriers to adjusting the size of the work force in response to a proﬁt
squeeze. 
outsourcing. The United States has been outsourcing jobs on a large
scale for the past two decades in the form of its ongoing trade deﬁcit. The
claim that outsourcing is something new, and related to the post-2000
productivity growth upsurge, refers to white-collar jobs that American
ﬁrms are shifting to call centers and offshore programming specialty
establishments in countries like India. Consider a ﬁrm initially producing
1,000 units of output with 100 workers, for a productivity level of 10 units
per worker. Assume that total labor cost is 800 and proﬁts are 200. Now
imagine that 10 jobs are shifted to India and the new Indian workers are
paid one-quarter of the American wage, or 20 units per 10 jobs instead of
the previous 80 units. The ﬁrm must pay 20 for the imported services,
reducing output from 1,000 to 980 and raising productivity from the ini-
tial 10 to 980 divided by 90, or 10.9. Productivity has increased by 9 per-
cent, and proﬁts have increased from 200 to 280, or by 40 percent. 
It is unlikely that the entire beneﬁt of the cost savings through out-
sourcing will be retained by the ﬁrm. Competitive pressure will reduce
prices, and properly computed deﬂators will maintain the original level of
real output minus the spending on imported services. Thus, in principle,
outsourcing does increase U.S. productivity, but the question is by how
much. Anecdotal evidence suggests that white-collar jobs outsourced
over the past three years number in the hundreds of thousands rather than
millions, suggesting a productivity impact of a few basis points rather
than a few percentage points.51 Clearly, however, outsourcing of call cen-
ter and programming jobs is a by-product of ICT innovation in the late
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p. A4). This does not include jobs outsourced to foreign-owned contractors, which might
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always-on broadband communications.
labor market ﬂexibility. That there is a set of institutions that
make American labor markets more ﬂexible than those in some other
developed countries, particularly in Western Europe, is likewise nothing
new. The contrast between labor market institutions in the United States
and in Europe has been on the front burner of comparative macroeconom-
ics since the mid-1980s, when economists on both sides of the Atlantic
started trying to explain why European unemployment had increased
from below the American level in the 1960s to above it after 1985.52 The
question is whether the past several years have seen a signiﬁcant further
movement in the direction of ﬂexibility in the U.S. labor market that
could have facilitated corporate cost cutting and the achievement of faster
productivity growth.
A review of several labor market indicators casts doubt on the ﬂexibil-
ity hypothesis, simply because these indicators exhibit little change in
recent years. The share of the labor force working part-time has ﬂuctuated
in a narrow range around 16 percent since 1984. The Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics (BLS) series on the number of self-employed was roughly 9.4 mil-
lion in mid-2003, compared with 9.3 million in early 2000. The erosion of
union membership has remained on a steady downward glide path since
1984 after a sharp ratchet downward in 1980–83. The increased role of
temporary help agencies and other types of contingent worker contracts
was already evident to labor economists in 1999, before the recent pro-
ductivity growth take-off.53
Mismeasurement of Hours per Employee and Payroll Employment
Moving beyond substantive hypotheses, at least two possible dimen-
sions of mismeasurement are independent of the intangible capital mis-
measurement hypothesis discussed above. These seek to explain some
fraction of the post-2000 upsurge in productivity growth by arguing, for
different reasons, that hours per employee and payroll employment are
both understated, implying that aggregate hours of work are understated
and productivity is correspondingly overstated. Two of the counterparts
258 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
52. See, for instance, Lawrence and Schultze (1987).
53. See Katz and Krueger (1999, especially pp. 45–60).
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unusually rapid decline in hours per employee, occurring at an annual rate
of –1.16 percent, and the decline in the ratio of payroll to household
employment, at an annual rate of –0.51 percent.
hours per employee. Among others, Stephen Roach of Morgan
Stanley has long argued that hours per employee are understated because
modern technology, especially cellular telephones, laptop computers,
and at-home desktop computers, allows work to be performed outside of
the formal workday, and employers are under no restraint in expecting
their employees to put in extra hours. So what else is new? Many profes-
sionals, including novelists and even economics professors, have been
writing late into the night since the invention of the quill and candle,
much less the typewriter or the personal computer. Granted, employer
expectations of extra hours of work now extend to a broad professional
class of lawyers, consultants, investment bankers, and others who for-
merly had to do most or all of their work within the confines of the office
during the business day.
Yet one can be skeptical for several reasons. First, even before the
invention of the personal computer, work could be taken home in the form
of paper: lawyers read and revised briefs, doctors read medical journals,
and even the reading of business magazines counts as work for consul-
tants and investment bankers. Second, there was no sudden discontinuity
in 2000 or 2001 in hours worked at home or out of the ofﬁce; if hours of
work are undercounted, the source of the undercounting has grown grad-
ually in importance over the past two decades. Third, some unknown frac-
tion of work outside the ofﬁce is offset by consumption inside the ofﬁce.
The mix of work at home and consumption on the job has become so
entangled that it seems hopeless to think of any feasible measurement
project that could capture the extent of mismeasurement in all its nuances.
As a recent Wall Street Journal article explains,
Between meetings and memo writing, employees and their bosses log onto the
Internet to pay bills, manage their 401(k) accounts, shop for birthday gifts and
plan vacations. While attending their children’s school events, they use their
BlackBerrys to answer colleagues’ questions, proof letters, and make appoint-
ments with clients.54
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was a marked decline in employment as measured by the payroll survey
relative to employment as measured by the household survey (referred to
above as the payroll-to-household employment ratio, or EP/E). Recently
John Kitchen has developed the intriguing argument that payroll employ-
ment has been signiﬁcantly understated during the period since its last
benchmark revision in March 2002.55 Kitchen argues that, early in a
recovery, payroll employment typically shows greater weakness than
household employment, but that it is typically revised upward when such
discrepancies arise. To demonstrate this, Kitchen compares “current vin-
tage” payroll employment data—for example, 1983 data as recorded in
2003—with contemporary data available in 1983 and 1984 government
publications. To demonstrate that revisions in payroll data are inﬂuenced
by contemporary household data, he runs a regression over three early-
recovery periods (1975–76, 1983–84, and 1991–92) in which the current
vintage payroll data are explained by contemporary payroll data and con-
temporary household data. The fact that the household data enter with a
signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient implies that the payroll data are revised
upward by a larger amount, the greater the positive discrepancy between
household and contemporary payroll data. 
Applying his estimated regression equation to the current period,
Kitchen estimates that, in July 2003, payroll employment was understated
by 570,000, or about 0.44 percent. Translating this directly into an over-
statement in the productivity data would reduce output per hour in the
NFPB sector in 2003:2 by 0.44 percent and would reduce its annual
growth rate between 2000:2 and 2003:2 from 3.46 to 3.31 percent, a rela-
tively small downward revision.
However, Kitchen’s plausible argument has been contradicted by the
BLS’s announcement, in early October 2003, that payroll jobs for March
2003 were being revised downward by 145,000, or about 0.1 percent of
the total, not upward as Kitchen had predicted. That small downward
revision would apply through 2003:1, and levels thereafter would pre-
sumably be affected as well. The revised productivity estimates that
incorporate the payroll revision will not be released until February 2004.
Kitchen still expects, based on the precedent of 1992–93, that the revision
to payroll employment to be announced in October 2004 for the period
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benchmark revision was a small negative, but the 1993 benchmark was a
signiﬁcant upward revision that resulted in higher growth in payroll jobs
for the period from March 1992 to March 1993. He feels that “the jury is
still out” about payroll jobs growth after March 2003.56
This completes my treatment of the second main goal of the paper,
which was to examine substantive and measurement hypotheses that
might explain the upsurge of productivity growth in 2000–03—both the
more rapid estimated trend growth rate and the positive deviations from
trend that are outside the range of historical experience. One can draw
from this review of explanations several alternative implications for the
future, ranging from the optimistic assessment that the recent acceleration
is permanent, to the opposite view that it is inherently temporary. An
optimist would point to the estimated increase in trend productivity
growth to a rate above 3 percent, faster even than in the peak years of the
early 1960s, and to a continuing wave of innovation in creating this accel-
eration in trend growth. An intermediate view would emphasize the role
of intangible investment in spreading out and delaying the productivity
beneﬁts of the investment boom of the late 1990s. Although the intangible
mismeasurement hypothesis implies that productivity growth may have
been overstated during the period of slower ICT investment growth dur-
ing 2000–03, nothing in this view rules out a new wave of ICT investment
and another period like the late 1990s, when productivity growth was
understated. The most pessimistic approach emphasizes the unprece-
dented timing pattern of S&P reported proﬁts, which exhibited an artiﬁ-
cial boom in 1998–2000 followed by an utter collapse that let loose a
wave of savage cost cutting that continues to this day. Now that costs
have been cut, the resulting productivity gains are unprecedented, and
proﬁts are resurging to above their 1997 peak. The pressure for cost cut-
ting and hence that unique prop to productivity growth must inevitably
fade, but at some unknowable rate. 
Connecting the Past to the Future
The third goal of this paper is to forecast growth in potential real GDP
over the next two decades through 2023. This requires going beyond a
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determinants of future growth in the working-age population, in hours per
employee, and in the mix and payroll-to-household employment ratio
terms that are needed to translate productivity growth in the NFPB sector
into an equivalent growth rate for real GDP in the economy as a whole.
Although, in principle, future economic growth also depends on changes
in the employment rate and the LFPR, likely changes in these ratios on
average over the next two decades are too small to make any appreciable
difference to potential real GDP growth.57
Future Productivity Growth
This paper’s extensive review of the U.S. productivity data poses a
dilemma in thinking about the future. What growth rate of productivity
should be projected over the next twenty years? The estimated productiv-
ity growth trend reaches 3.05 percent a year in 2003:2, which is substan-
tially more rapid than the consensus in recent research that the trend has
been running at roughly 2.25 percent. In contrast, if one were to base a
forecast for the next two decades on the two decades ending in 2003:2, the
forecast value would be the actual average over 1983–2003 of 2.03 per-
cent a year. To return to the question posed at the outset, how much of the
past is relevant in making future projections? 
The estimated trend is, of course, merely a reﬂection of the past actual
outcome and is capable of moving quite rapidly when confronted with a
sharp difference between the actual outcome and the current trend. For
instance, my own estimate of the productivity growth trend (bottom panel
of ﬁgure 1) has increased from 1.64 percent in 1994:1 to 2.76 percent in
2000:1, a span of merely six years. The same could happen in reverse if at
some point in the future there were a period of years with slow productiv-
ity growth. 
Several factors lead me to conclude that productivity growth over the
next twenty years will be faster than the 2.03 percent annual average reg-
istered between 1983 and 2003, not to mention the 1.42 percent average
between 1972 and 1995. Productivity growth was held down in the 1970s
and early 1980s by the dislocations caused by oil shocks, high inﬂation
262 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
57. If the employment rate in 2023 is 94.5 percent rather than 95.0 percent, for exam-
ple, this implies a reduction in the growth rate of potential real GDP of a mere 0.03 per-
centage point a year.
1790-03_Gordon.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 262and unemployment, and high and volatile interest rates. Numerous econo-
mists have identiﬁed a shift toward greater macroeconomic stability in the
mid-1980s. Another reason for optimism is that the 1990s brought a new
and fruitful interaction among innovations in computer hardware, soft-
ware, and communications equipment that appears to have allowed a
greater degree of business reorganization and a greater opportunity for
intangible capital investment than in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Working in the opposite direction are several reasons to believe that
productivity growth over the next two decades will be slower than the
mid-2003 estimated trend of 3.05 percent a year. Most important is the
role of the 2000–01 proﬁt squeeze in motivating an unprecedented wave
of cost cuts and reductions in labor input. Some of the productivity boom
has been the counterpart of this cost slashing, and productivity growth is
likely to decline in response to the rapid growth in proﬁts that is already
evident. Second, the intangible capital hypothesis argues that productivity
growth was overstated in the period of slow ICT investment growth in
2000–03, just as it was understated before 2000. Third, many of the most
fruitful applications of the marriage of computer hardware, software, and
communications technology have already occurred. The size of human
ﬁngers and the ability of human eyes to absorb information from tiny
screens set limits to miniaturization. It seems quite likely that diminishing
returns will set in, at some point over the next two decades, in the fruitful
application of the innovation wave of the late 1990s. 
Fourth, the recent work of Jorgenson, Mun Ho, and Stiroh emphasizes
that educational attainment in the United States has reached a plateau,
implying that the contribution of changes in labor quality to TFP growth
will taper down gradually to zero over the next two decades from its aver-
age over 1973–2003.58 Speciﬁcally, they estimate the rate of increase of
labor quality to have been 0.38 percent a year in 1995–2001, and they
project that it will decline to a much slower 0.16 percent a year over
2001–11 and fall to a negligible 0.02 percent in 2011–21. When multi-
plied by a labor income share of, say, 0.65, this reduction in labor quality
growth would result in a reduction in trend productivity growth of
0.19 percentage point a year when 2001–21 is compared with
1995–2001. This mechanical conversion of educational attainment into a
measure of labor quality is controversial, and one might argue that the
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dard computer software far greater than their parents’ might offset most
or even all of the plateauing in educational attainment.
Weighing these factors together, I view future productivity growth
over the next two decades as more likely to fall in the range of 2.2 to
2.8 percent a year than the 2003 estimated trend of 3.05 percent or the
actual 2000–03 growth rate of 3.46 percent. In the concluding section of
this paper, I take the mean of 2.2 and 2.8, that is, 2.5 percent a year, as my
central projection of future productivity growth in the NFPB sector.
Population Growth
When the trustees of the Social Security Administration forecast
potential GDP growth of only 1.8 percent in the period 2040–80, the most
important reason for their surprisingly low growth rate is their projection
of population growth at only 0.2 percent a year. For comparison, table 1
above shows that growth in the working-age population in the United
States over the period 1987–2003 was 1.2 percent a year. Population pro-
jections require the determination of three essential numbers, which one
may call the “demography triplets”: the fertility rate, the mortality rate,
and the number of net immigrants. This section discusses each brieﬂy and
is based in part on the 2003 report of Social Security’s Technical Panel on
Assumptions and Methods (TPAM), which is convened every four years
to make recommendations on demographic and economic assumptions to
the Social Security Advisory Board. All data in this section on population
come from the 2003 Social Security Trustees’ Report and the 2003
TPAM report.59
The starting point for demographic projections is the fact that the
replacement rate for fertility, that is, the total fertility rate (TFR) that will
maintain a constant population, is 2.1 births per female of childbearing
age. In recent years the United States has been running a TFR of 2.05,
very close to the replacement rate, in stark contrast to most other rich
countries in the world. TFRs in Italy, Spain, Japan, and several other
countries have dropped to 1.3, while France and Germany have TFRs of
1.5 to 1.6. Will American exceptionalism in this regard continue, or will
the American fertility rate trend down to converge with the rates now
prevalent in the European Union and Japan?
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the U.S. TFR in the range of 1.9 to 2.0, slightly less than the recent rate of
2.05 but substantially higher than in Europe. This projection should be
viewed in the context of a wide range in the TFR over the postwar period,
from a low of 1.74 in 1976 to a high of 3.68 in 1957, the height of the
baby boom. When considering how much of the past is relevant for the
future, demographers with near unanimity reject any relevance of the
baby-boom period of 1947–64 and instead focus on reasons why the U.S.
TFR is not likely to decline toward the values observed in Western
Europe or Japan. 
The ﬁrst argument in favor of continuity is that the composition of the
U.S. population favors relatively high fertility, because of the growing
share in the population of Hispanics, who had a TFR in 2001 of 2.75.
Even among non-Hispanic white women, however, the TFR during the
decade 1991–2002 fell within a range from 1.77 to 1.87, considerably
higher than in most other high-income countries.60 The second argument
is more qualitative: women in the United States are better able to combine
work and childbearing. The American labor market allows more ﬂexible
work hours and makes it easier to leave and then reenter the labor force.
The relevance of labor market institutions is validated by a positive corre-
lation between measures of female labor force activity and the fertility
rate observed across highly developed nations.61
More generally, the higher TFR in the United States results from a set
of differences in culture and institutions, including not just the ﬂexibility
of labor markets but also the greater independence of young people at an
earlier age. Edmund Phelps has provided an economist’s description of
this difference in youth cultures.62 American teenagers gain early contact
with money and incentives. They start while in high school, working at
McDonalds and Burger King. Unlike European college students, who
enjoy blanket tuition and stipend grants, most American college students
must work for part of their college expenses, borrowing the rest and
thereby undertaking an obligation to repay the loans by taking jobs soon
after college. Data indicate a much higher incidence of long-term unem-
ployment among European youth than in the United States, and lower
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outcomes, because young people in countries like Italy are much less
likely to be ﬁnancially independent at age twenty-ﬁve or thirty and more
likely to be living with their parents—an atmosphere quite uncongenial to
marriage, much less childbearing. These transatlantic differences in labor
markets and youth culture may help to explain differences in fertility rates
and support the apparent consensus among demographers that American
exceptionalism is likely to continue. 
Long-term population growth projections also require estimates of
mortality rates, which have declined continuously over the last two cen-
turies, but at a highly variable pace. The central question about which
opinions vary is the future rate of decline of the age- and sex-adjusted
death rate for persons aged 65 and over. That rate declined at an annual
rate of 0.78 percent between 1900 and 2000 and 0.91 percent during
1950–2000, but at much slower rates of 0.55 percent between 1979 and
2000 and 0.27 percent between 1996 and 2000. The assumption of the
Social Security trustees is an annual rate of decline of 0.71 percent a year
between 2002 and 2027. The rate of decline was much slower after 1982
than in the unusual period 1968–82, a fact that some experts attribute to
the initial inﬂuence of Medicare in bringing down death rates, as free
basic medical care was brought to the elderly population for the ﬁrst
time.63 The 2003 TPAM report recommends projecting a rate of decline
over the next seventy-ﬁve years equal to that of the last ﬁfty years, that is,
0.84 percent a year (this differs from the historical 0.91 percent rate of
decline cited above for 1950–2000 because of adjustments for changes in
the relative weight of subgroups within the sixty-ﬁve-and-over age
group). Their most compelling argument is ironic, in that the TPAM
report chose to ignore foreign experience in projecting the fertility rate
but ﬁnds it relevant in projecting the mortality rate. The report notes that
the slow post-1980 rate of decline of mortality in the United States is
unusual, and that the more rapid rates of decline in other high-income
countries provide a better guide for the future. 
The third of the demography triplets is the assumption about future
immigration. This is by far the most controversial issue in assessing the
ofﬁcial Social Security assumptions about future population growth. The
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shows, for the full period 1900–2002, net legal immigration and, after
1960, an estimate of illegal immigration as percentages of the U.S. popu-
lation.64 After ﬂuctuating between 0.6 and 1.0 percent of the population
most of the time between 1900 and 1913, immigration fell off to a bare
trickle between 1933 and 1947, followed by a gradual but steady recovery
to 0.41 percent in 2002.
Somewhat incredibly given this historical perspective, which shows a
growth rate of total immigration since 1970 of 3.75 percent a year, the
Social Security projections assume not just zero growth in the future, but
an absolute decline from 1.4 million total immigrants in 2002 to a steady
state after 2020 of 900,000 new immigrants a year. This can be translated
into an assumption that total net immigration will decline from 0.41 per-
cent of the population in 2002 to 0.21 percent in 2080. 
The future behavior of immigration is truly the wild card in projecting
future growth in population and hence in potential output. A continuation
of the past 3.75 percent annual growth rate of immigration for the next
seventy-ﬁve years would imply unprecedented ratios of foreign-born to
the total U.S. population by the end of that period. But to project negative
growth implies a discontinuity that is without any basis. Labor econo-
mists would presumably model the immigration process as the intersec-
tion of supply and demand, both of which would be likely to increase in
the future as the populations of the immigration-supplying countries
(Mexico, Central America, China, India, Pakistan, and others) continue to
grow, while a growing population and rising income per capita within the
United States increase the demand for both skilled and unskilled immi-
grant labor. 
Although many different assumptions could be justiﬁed, a conservative
basis for estimating future population growth is to forecast that the annual
growth rate of immigration will gradually slow from the post-1970 rate of
3.75 percent a year to a rate after two decades (that is, after 2023) that is
consistent with a constant ratio of immigration to the population. A simu-
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cates that a 1 percent long-run growth rate of both immigration and the
population would imply that the ratio of immigration to the population
eventually settles down at about 0.5 percent, above the ratio reached in
2001–02 but substantially below the historical peaks reached in 1900–13.
The 2003 TPAM report chose a more conservative approach, assuming
that the annual number of net immigrants should increase at half the rate
of population growth until the ratio of net immigration to the population
levels off at 0.32 percent, the historical average from 1821 to 2002. I ﬁnd
this reliance on 180 years of history to be incongruous with every other
demographic and economic assumption in the report and see no reason
why the annual growth rate of immigration should suddenly drop today
from its recent average of 3.75 percent to a mere 0.6 percent. The tapered
decline in the growth rate assumed here makes only a small difference to
projected population growth over the next twenty years; it makes a much
bigger difference over the following ﬁfty-ﬁve years. 
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Figure 5. Net Annual Immigration as a Share of U.S. Population, 1900–2002
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census and author’s calculations.
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cent a year, somewhat higher than the projection for the same period in
the 2003 TPAM report. The difference is due entirely to the more gradual
tapering off of the growth rate of immigration.65
Hours per Employee
The last crucial number in estimating future potential GDP growth is
hours per employee. Discussion of hours per employee can be confusing,
because there are separate measures of hours per employee in the NFPB
sector and of hours per household employee in the total economy. It is this
latter concept that the 2003 TPAM report projected to grow at a rate of
zero over the next seventy-ﬁve years. But the growth rate of NFPB hours
per employee has a strong negative trend. How can we reconcile these
apparently conﬂicting measures?
The usual concept of hours per employee, discussed previously, is cal-
culated as aggregate hours in the NFPB sector divided by payroll employ-
ment in that sector. As shown in table 11, the actual 1987–2001 growth
rate of NFPB hours per employee was –0.15 percent a year, representing
the difference between growth in NFPB aggregate hours of 1.46 percent a
year and growth in NFPB employment of 1.61 percent a year. Between
2001 and 2003 the decline in hours per employee proceeded at a faster
rate of decline of –0.45 percent a year, representing a sharp downturn in
the estimated trend with little change in the ratio of actual to trend (see
table 1). 
Turning to the aggregate economy in the ﬁrst column of table 11, I
assume that hours per payroll employee fell at the same modest rate dur-
ing 1987–2001 as in the NFPB sector. Because payroll employment grew
0.41 percentage point a year faster than household employment during
1987–2001, hours per household employee rose  at an annual rate of
0.26 percent. This surprising fact represents the offsetting impact of two
long-term trends. More household members today hold multiple jobs,
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household employment. But more of these jobs are part-time, causing a
reduction in hours per payroll employee. These two effects did not quite
cancel out, in that hours per household employee rose slightly during
1987–2001. The 2003 TPAM report interprets this increase as temporary
and predicts a growth rate of hours per household employee of exactly
zero over the next seventy-ﬁve years. This paper adopts their assumption.
Implications for Potential Real GDP Growth
Table 11 provides a template for forecasts of potential GDP over the
next twenty years. I base the projections on the analysis above, plus the
growth rates of the components of the output identity over the period
between two benchmark quarters, 1987:3 and 2001:2. Here the two left-
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Table 11. Actual and Predicted Growth Rates of Components of Real GDP and
Related Variables
Percent
Actual, 1987:3–2001:2 Projected, 2003–23
Nonfarm Nonfarm
private private
Component or  Total business Total business
related variable economy sector economy sector
Components
Output per hour 1.28 1.78 2.00 2.50
Hours per payroll employeea –0.15 –0.15 –0.10 –0.10
Employment rate 0.12 . . . 0.00 . . .
Labor force participation rate 0.13 . . . 0.00 . . .
Working-age population 1.16 . . . 0.98 . . .
Mix effect –0.51 . . . –0.20 . . .
Payroll-household  0.47 . . . 0.10 . . .
employment ratio
Related variables
Aggregate hours 1.36 1.46 0.98 1.08
Payroll employment 1.82 1.61 1.08 1.18
Household employmentb 1.41 . . . 0.98 . . .
Hours per household  0.26 . . . 0.00 . . .
employee
Output 2.95 3.24 3.28 3.58
Source: See appendix A.
a. It is assumed that aggregate hours per payroll employee changes at the same rate in the total economy as in the nonfarm pri-
vate business sector as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
b. Growth in payroll employment minus growth in the payroll-to-household employment ratio.
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components of the output identity, plus growth rates of related variables
that can be extracted from the ratios in the identity or from published
information. 
Forecasting potential real GDP growth for 2003–23 requires a projec-
tion for each component of the output identity. I have already settled on a
future growth rate of NFPB output per hour of 2.50 percent a year. Also,
the assumption of zero growth in hours per household employee implies
that the growth of hours per payroll employee must be exactly offset by
the growth of payroll employment relative to household employment. I
choose growth rates of –0.10 and +0.10 percent a year for these two off-
setting factors. Offsetting the projected decline in the growth rate of hours
per household employee from +0.26 percent a year in 1987–2001 to zero
during 2003–23 is a projected decline in the growth rate of the mix effect
from –0.51 percent in 1987–2001 to –0.20 percent in 2003–23. I see no
reason to forecast changes in the employment rate from its value of
roughly 95 percent in early 2001, or in the labor force participation rate
from its early-2001 value. Numerous offsetting trends inﬂuence the
LFPR. The movement of females into the labor force, which boosted the
LFPR between the 1960s and 1980s, appears to be largely completed. The
long-standing shift to earlier retirement ages, especially for adult men,
also appears to have stabilized or even reversed.66 This paper’s estimated
trend for the LFPR registers a growth rate of zero between 1995 and 2003
(table 9). Thus I project a zero growth rate for both the employment rate
and the LFPR.
The earlier discussion of population growth emerged with a projected
2003–23 growth rate of 0.98 percent a year. This completes the list of
components to be forecast in order to project potential real GDP; the pre-
dicted growth rate that emerges from these component forecasts is
3.28 percent a year over the next two decades. Even though NFPB pro-
ductivity is forecast to grow 0.72 percentage point faster than during
1987–2001, potential real GDP is forecast to grow only 0.33 percentage
point faster. The difference is explained by a shift from an increasing
employment rate (a declining NAIRU) to a stable employment rate, a shift
from a slight increase in the LFPR to a stable LFPR, and a decline in pop-
ulation growth by 0.18 percentage point a year.
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Productivity growth experienced a second acceleration in 2000–03 fol-
lowing the initial productivity revival of 1995–2000. This recent upsurge
has brought good news for the American standard of living, bad news for
many American workers made jobless by a continuing erosion of payroll
employment, and new puzzles for academic research. This paper has
placed the 2000–03 productivity acceleration at center stage and illumi-
nated it from the three perspectives of postwar history, possible causes,
and prospects for future economic growth. 
The paper began with three goals: to forecast future potential GDP
growth for two decades into the future, to explain the recent productivity
upsurge, and to assess the recent productivity performance in the context
of trends and cycles over ﬁfty years of postwar history. Both future pro-
jections and historical analysis require the linking of potential GDP
growth to productivity growth through an output identity that identiﬁes
seven variables, including productivity and the employment rate; the
product of these seven variables must by deﬁnition equal real GDP. The
paper’s analysis began with history, developing an econometric decom-
position of all seven components of the output identity into trends, regular
cyclical responses, and residual unexplained responses. It then proceeded
to examine possible explanations for the recent productivity upsurge,
including both substantive hypotheses and possible sources of measure-
ment error. The paper’s last section projected components of the output
identity out over two decades, yielding a forecast of future potential real
GDP growth. 
As the ﬁrst step in the empirical analysis, the paper established trends
for real GDP and the components of the output identity over the period
since late 1954. It set the trend of the employment rate as a log-linear
spline trend between benchmark quarters having similar characteristics.
For productivity growth and the other ﬁve components of the output iden-
tity, the paper used an average of results from a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
and a Kalman ﬁlter that estimates a time-varying coefﬁcient in an equa-
tion that controls for output ﬂuctuations. The implied trend for potential
real GDP was obtained by multiplying together the trends for the seven
components of the output identity. The most important conclusion was
that the estimated trend of productivity growth in 2002–03 was slightly
above 3.0 percent a year, substantially above the recent consensus of pro-
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achieved in the early 1960s. The corresponding trend in potential real
GDP in mid-2003 was 3.38 percent a year.
Armed with these trends, the paper developed a dynamic econometric
analysis in which changes in deviations from trend for each component of
the output identity depend on current and lagged changes in the output
deviation from trend, a set of lagged dependent variables, an error correc-
tion term, and an end-of-expansion effect. Each component exhibited a
highly signiﬁcant positive or negative response to output ﬂuctuations, and
the end-of-expansion coefﬁcients told a consistent story in which labor
input grows too rapidly relative to output in the ﬁnal stages of an expan-
sion, while productivity grows too slowly, and in which this overhiring is
eliminated in the recession and early stages of the recovery. These results
yielded another important conclusion: that the econometric coefﬁcients
based on nearly ﬁve decades of postwar history fail to explain why actual
productivity growth exceeded trend growth in 2002–03; a large unex-
plained residual emerges as the difference between rapid actual growth
and a prediction that productivity growth should have been below trend
due to the sluggish below-trend rate of output growth during this interval.
Since the same regression is estimated for all seven components of the out-
put identity, one can trace the counterpart of positive productivity residuals
to negative residuals for other components of the output identity.
In previous business cycles, the ﬁrst four recovery quarters shared in
common with 2002–03 a very rapid rate of productivity growth relative to
trend, which I have called the “early-recovery productivity bubble.” In
every past episode the large positive excess of actual over trend produc-
tivity growth was followed by a return to trend or even below-trend
growth in the following eight quarters. Although the econometric equa-
tion can explain the earlier bubble episodes with small statistical residu-
als, the positive residual is very large in 2002–03, again conﬁrming that
the recent upsurge was unusual by every measure, including the accelera-
tion of the estimated trend, the positive deviation of actual growth from
trend, and the inability of the econometric coefﬁcients to capture the
dynamics of changes in the deviation of actual from trend.
If the recent productivity upsurge was outside the bounds of normal
cyclical behavior, what explains it? Two complementary hypotheses
occupy center stage. First, the upsurge was preceded by an unusual tra-
jectory of corporate proﬁts, which grew rapidly in 1998–2000 and then
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accounting scandals, and massive write-offs. The extraordinary proﬁt
squeeze led in turn to savage cost cutting and layoffs, reducing labor input
long after real GDP had begun to recover in late 2001. But, second, ﬁrms
could not have maintained or increased output following the reduction in
labor input without the help of both measured ICT investment and unmea-
sured complementary investments in intangible capital. Recent research
shows that intangible capital that is complementary to computer hardware
and software can cause measurement errors in ofﬁcial data on productiv-
ity, leading productivity growth to be understated in a period of buoyant
ICT investment such as 1995–2000, and to be overstated in a period of
slumping ICT investment such as 2000–02. Both the proﬁt squeeze
hypothesis and the intangible mismeasurement hypothesis imply that the
supercharged productivity growth rates observed in 2002–03 are inher-
ently temporary and will soon return to the still-respectable estimated
trend of around 3.0 percent.
Projections of potential GDP growth for the next two decades require
forecasts of growth in productivity, population, hours per employee, and
the other components of the output identity. I have argued that the under-
lying trend in productivity growth will decline from the recent rate of
3.0 percent a year to about 2.5 percent in the next two decades, because of
the unwinding of temporary factors bolstering recent productivity growth,
and because of potential diminishing returns in the exploitation of New
Economy innovation, as well as the implications of a plateau in educa-
tional attainment for sharply slowing future growth in labor quality. Pop-
ulation growth is forecast to slow from 1.2 percent a year over the past
decade to around 1.0 percent, which is still a higher forecast than that
embedded in current Social Security projections. Hours per employee (as
deﬁned by the household survey), the employment rate, and the labor
force participation rate are all forecast to be unchanged over the next two
decades. 
Taken together, these assumptions yield a projection for potential real
GDP growth of 3.28 percent a year over 2003–23. This is much slower
than the rate forecast by the optimists cited at the beginning of this paper,
who thought (or still think) that 4.0 percent annual growth of potential
output is feasible, but more optimistic than the future growth assumptions
embodied in the annual report of the trustees of the Social Security
Administration. Along the way, this examination of future trends has
274 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
1790-03_Gordon.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 274required extending the analysis from the traditional turf of productivity
forecasting to the less familiar terrain of fertility rates, mortality rates, and
immigration assumptions.
In the end, this exercise in crystal ball gazing is a humbling experience.
Although forecasts of the employment rate or the labor force participation
rate over the next two decades may have only a small margin of error, the
degree of uncertainty is much larger for three key components of the out-
put identity, namely, growth in productivity, in population, and in hours
per employee. Neither economics nor statistics provides much guidance
about the measurement of uncertainty in making these forecasts, and part
of this uncertainty concerns how much of the past to use in making future
projections. Other demographers cited here have, within the same study,
taken 180 years of history as relevant for immigration, 50 years of history
as relevant for mortality, but only 20 years of history as relevant for fertil-
ity. Is it surprising, then, that economists disagree on whether the next
two decades of productivity growth is better represented by average
growth over the past two years, or the past eight, or the past twenty? Per-
haps the only safe forecast is that we will be surprised sooner rather than
later, just as the recorded productivity growth rates of the past two years
would astonish and bewilder any Rip van Winkle who had fallen asleep in




All data were obtained from the websites of the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics (BLS; www.bls.gov) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA;
www.bea.gov), were current as of September 15, 2003, and were
retrieved for the period 1948:1 to 2003:2. Data subsequently released for
2003:3 and any revisions subsequent to September 15, 2003, are not
included in the analysis.
The BLS data are identiﬁed below by their symbol in the paper (see
equation 2) and by their BLS series identiﬁer. “NFPB” refers to the non-
farm private business sector:
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NFPB aggregate hours of work (AB) PRS85006033
NFPB output (QB) PRS85006043
Nonagricultural payroll employment  CES0000000001
Civilian noninstitutional population (N) LNU00000000
Civilian labor force (L) LNS11000000
Civilian employment (E) LNS12000000
NFPB output per hour was calculated as QB/AB, and NFPB hours per
employee was calculated as AB/EB. 
Initial research for this paper used private nonagricultural payroll
employment from the Current Employment Survey (CES0500000001) as
a proxy for NFPB employment. The preferred measure for EB listed above
is not listed in the quarterly news release of the BLS productivity data but
is available on the BLS website. It differs from the CES measure in sev-
eral ways: it includes part of private nonfarm employment not covered by
the CES, as well as employees of government enterprises, nonfarm self-
employed workers, and nonfarm unpaid family workers, and it excludes
employment in nonproﬁt enterprises. The two sources grew between
2000:2 and 2003:2 at annual rates of –0.72 percent for the CES series and
–1.04 percent for the preferred NFPB series, implying an overstatement
of the decline in NFPB hours per employee when the CES series is used.
The BEA website was the source for quarterly real GDP (table 1.2) and
annual agricultural employment (table 6.8c), which was interpolated from
annual to quarterly. Data used for total payroll employment EP are the sum
of this interpolated quarterly series on agricultural employment and the
ofﬁcial BLS series listed above for nonagricultural payroll employment. 
Smoothing of Jumps in Household Data
BLS data on population, civilian labor force, and civilian household
employment exhibit periodic jumps when they are adjusted for the latest
census results. To eliminate the effect of these jumps, I calculated a
smoothing adjustment for six quarters when the annual growth rate of the
population exceeded 2.5 percent and this rate of change appeared to be a
clear outlier from neighboring data. These outlier quarters were 1953:1,
1960:1, 1972:1, 1990:1, 2000:1, and 2003:1. The smoothing exercise was
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factors were then applied to the labor force and employment data. Thus
the smoothing affected all data reported in the paper for N and EP/E,
whereas the ratios L/N and E/L were not affected. Excess population
growth in the outlier quarters was calculated by subtracting the average
quarterly growth rate during the four quarters preceding the jump quarter.
The excess growth, in all cases except 1953:1, was then spread evenly
over the 40 quarters preceding the jump by multiplying the original popu-
lation in those quarters by enx, where n indexes quarters, starting at 0 in the
40th quarter before the target quarter, and x is the excess growth in the tar-
get quarter divided by 40. For 1953:1 the excess was spread over the 39
following quarters by multiplying them all by e(40–m)(–x), where m indexes
quarters, starting at 0 in the target quarter, and x is the excess growth.
Deﬁnition of Benchmark Quarters
The trend-through-benchmarks (TTB) detrending method requires the
choice of benchmark quarters to divide the periods. To establish quarters
that represent roughly the same degree of cyclical pressure in each busi-
ness cycle, I chose those when the actual unemployment rate was equal to
the NAIRU, where the latter is estimated in Gordon (1998), as updated in
Eller and Gordon (2003). In each business cycle, starting at the trough,
the unemployment rate declines through the NAIRU and in the next
recession rises through the NAIRU; the benchmark quarters occur at the
ﬁrst of these events, the quarter when the actual unemployment rate ﬁrst
declines below the NAIRU.
Table A1 lists the benchmark quarters. For convenience I have taken
the pre-1993 benchmark quarters from the list in Gordon (1993, table 3)
and have added 1994:4. As yet there has been no quarter during the cur-
rent recovery when the unemployment rate has fallen below the NAIRU,
and so I take 2001:2, a quarter during the most recent recession when
unemployment was rising through the NAIRU, as the terminal point for
calculating growth rates. The choice of 1994:4 is easy: it is a period like
1987:3, when the economy was expanding at a moderate pace with sub-
dued inﬂation. The choice of the terminal date 2001:2 is more problem-
atic. Because the unemployment rate had fallen so low in 1999–2000, it
had not yet risen as far as the NAIRU even in 2001:2, in the middle of the
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the range of 5.2 to 5.4 percent in 2001.) Yet to place the terminal date
later would yield readings on labor force participation and hours per
employee that reﬂect weak labor market conditions and are not compara-
ble to the earlier benchmark quarters. 
Timing of End-of-Expansion Dummy Variables
The end-of-expansion (EOE) dummy variables are shown in table A2,
where k represents the number of the dummy (corresponding to the coef-
ﬁcients shown in tables 4 and 5). As explained in the text, each of the
seven dummy variables equals 1/M during the “on” quarters shown in the
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Table A1. Unemployment Rate in Benchmark Quarters, 1954–2001









Terminal date 2001:2 4.8
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics data; Gordon (1993, p. 285).
a. Measured from peak to peak.
b. Selected as described in the text. The short business cycles of 1957–60 and 1980–81 are omitted because actual unemploy-
ment fell below the NAIRU in 1959–60 only brieﬂy and by a trivial amount, and in 1980–81 actual unemployment never fell
below the NAIRU.
Table A2. Timing of End-of-Expansion Dummy Variables, 1955–2003a
Dummy variable (k) M D(k) = 1/M during ND ( k ) = –1/N during
1 7 1955:4–1957:2 4 1957:3–1958:2
2 8 1958:3–1960:2 8 1961:1–1962:4
3 7 1968:2–1969:4 6 1970:2–1971:3
4 7 1973:1–1974:3 7 1974:4–1976:2
5 11 1978:4–1981:2 4 1982:3–1983:2
6 8 1988:2–1990:1 8 1991:1–1992:4
7 5 2000:1–2001:1 7 2001:4–2003:2
a. The D(k) variables would be entered as 1/M and –1/N if the data were annual. With quarterly data, as in this paper, they are
instead deﬁned as 4/M and –4/M. 
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of the initial interval of excessive labor input growth, and N the length of
the subsequent correction. With a few minor exceptions, the timing of the
ﬁrst ﬁve variables corresponds to that listed in Gordon (1993, p. 291), and
the sixth to the “early EOE effect” discussed in Gordon (1993, p. 300).
The “on” period for 2000–01 was chosen to begin after the peak quarter
of real GDP growth (1999:4) and to extend to the peak quarter as identi-
ﬁed by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2001:1). The “off”
period was chosen to begin in the ﬁrst quarter of positive real GDP
growth in the recovery (2001:4) and extend through the end of the sample
period.
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Discussion
Martin Neil Baily: This paper continues the tradition of Robert Gordon’s
insightful evaluations of productivity and potential GDP growth, two
related issues that are among the most important in empirical macro-
economics. Gordon devotes most of the paper to ﬁguring how to separate
out the trend rate of productivity growth from the cycle. This is a tough
assignment given what appear to be rather sharp shifts in the trend in the
early 1970s and in the mid-1990s, overlaid with cyclical effects that look
very different in the past two cycles. Gordon’s views about productivity
have changed over time, and appropriately so, given the new data and the
revisions of older data that have emerged.
As part of the process of separating trend from cycle, Gordon reexam-
ines the ﬁndings of the classic paper by Arthur Okun that introduced the
concept of potential output and ﬁrst examined a puzzle in its behavior:
why ﬂuctuations of actual around potential GDP are so much larger (by a
3-to-1 ratio in Okun) than those of the unemployment rate around its
baseline, what we now call the NAIRU, or natural rate of unemployment.
Finally, Gordon uses his assessment of the productivity growth trend to
examine what assumption should be made about potential GDP growth
into the future. This is a key issue for the future of Social Security.
The paper explores three approaches to identifying trend and cycle.
The ﬁrst uses benchmark periods, for which it is judged that the business
cycle was at about the same point at the beginning and the end of the
period. Alternatively, a regression analysis can be done in which right-
hand-side variables pick up the cyclical variations in the time series,
allowing for an adjusted or trend value to be separated out. Finally, ﬁlters
can be used to smooth a cyclical series. Both the Kalman ﬁlter and the
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ﬂexible approach that allows the researcher to select from a range of
smoothing parameters, depending on the series to be smoothed. That is
both a plus and a minus, of course, since one sometimes gets a sense that
the parameters are being chosen on the basis of some prior belief about
the right answer.
Picking benchmark dates has the danger that it becomes an endogenous
process. The researcher may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to select dates without peek-
ing at the impact that different dates may have on the results he or she is
looking for. One solution is to use the dates selected by the Business
Cycle Dating Committee at the National Bureau of Economic Research,
although the committee looks at the same output and employment data
that go into measures of GDP and productivity. The regression approach
has appeal if one could ﬁnd both a sensible speciﬁcation and right-hand-
side variables that are exogenous. I am probably more willing than some
econometricians to accept that a particular variable is exogenous, but in
the case of aggregate productivity regressions it is very hard to ﬁnd vari-
ables that even come close to meeting a plausibility test. Most candidate
variables are related very closely either to output, which is the numerator
of any labor productivity measure, or to employment, which is related to
the denominator. In his regression approach, Gordon has used a variant of
output as his right-hand-side variable, and his regressions have a corre-
sponding tendency to overestimate the cyclical component of productivity
variations, as Gordon himself notes. It would be helpful to contrast Gor-
don’s ﬁndings with those of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA),
which has used a labor demand equation instead of a productivity regres-
sion, and the study by Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro, cited by Gordon, which
uses yet a different approach.1 Those two studies found that the post-1995
acceleration in productivity was not at all a cyclical phenomenon.
Filtering approaches have been used in work at the Federal Reserve
Board and in the big cross-country study of growth at the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). My concern about
them is that they impose a particular pattern on the productivity data that
does not appear in the basic numbers. Since the ﬁlters avoid slope discon-
tinuities, they look ahead at an upcoming break in the trend and assume
that it must have started before the apparent date of the break point. I see
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to accelerate before 1996, but in Gordon’s results using ﬁltering methods,
and indeed in the OECD’s similar estimates for the United States, the pro-
ductivity acceleration started in the early 1990s. Maybe that is correct. I
have to admit that there seems to be no smoking-gun explanation of the
shift in the trend that can account for a sudden trend break in 1996. But it
would be more convincing if we could understand what forces kept pro-
ductivity growth below trend in the early 1990s.
A piecewise linear time trend ﬁts the labor productivity data in the
United States remarkably well. In my own work, I have simply imposed
break points on the data, but Steven N. Braun in his work at the CEA has
found it very hard to do as well as a piecewise linear time trend in ﬁtting
these data. A recent paper by James Kahn and Robert Rich has explored
this possibility further by using growth theory to suggest additional vari-
ables, including real wage movements, to help separate trend and cycle.2
These variables are measured using different source data and will have
different random errors. The Kahn-Rich ﬁtted trend productivity growth
rate comes very close to a piecewise trend.
Regardless of which adjustment approach one uses, it does now seem
clear that trend labor productivity growth picked up substantially in the
1990s, and the most recent data suggest that there may even have been a
further acceleration in the past two years. In the data available as this goes
to press, output per hour in nonfarm business grew at an astounding
4.4 percent annual rate from 2001:1 to 2003:3. The rate for manufacturing
is similar, indicating that rapid growth is continuing in the nonfarm, non-
manufacturing sector. Like Gordon, I am wary of the most recent data. In
principle, revisions up and down should be equally likely, but in practice
the GDP and productivity numbers were revised down in 1999, 2000, and
2001. This may indicate that some systematic error has entered the esti-
mation procedure and is yielding too optimistic a view of the economy in
preliminary numbers. 
One test of the 2002 data will come in December 2003 when the GDP
accounts are revised. We will ﬁnd out more about 2003 with the revisions
due in the summer of 2004. But unless the data are changed quite drasti-
cally, it looks as if the productivity acceleration has survived its ﬁrst busi-
ness downturn and, moreover, has survived the slump in technology
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a result of strong demand or of the wave of spending on information tech-
nology (IT). Gordon accepts the ﬁrst point but disputes the second.
On the question of whether IT is the reason for the productivity accel-
eration, I have been on both sides at different times. In 1988 I co-wrote a
Brookings Paper with Gordon on the role of IT and its interaction with
measurement issues and gave a variety of reasons why IT would not
show up in measured productivity growth. Measurement methods have
improved, but many of the same arguments made then still hold today.
In the late 1990s it seemed obvious that IT was the most important fac-
tor driving the productivity acceleration. All the evidence seemed to point
the same way, including sharp increases in the number of patents and in
the volume of R&D as well as the surge in IT investment. A range of stud-
ies using growth accounting techniques and other approaches supported
that view. Since 2000 I have scaled back my estimate of the importance of
IT to the productivity acceleration for the following reasons. First, growth
accounting decompositions, however valuable, do not prove that the
hedonically inﬂated IT capital is really being used productively. They
simply assume that is the case. Some reverse causality may also have
been at work in which the 1990s boom (in part) caused the surge in IT
spending rather than vice versa. Second, industry case studies at the
McKinsey Global Institute have found that there were many important
ingredients besides IT that caused productivity to rise in the late 1990s.3
Third, industry analysis by Jack Triplett and Barry Bosworth concluded
that the service industries that had experienced the largest increases in
labor productivity were the ones that had experienced the largest increases
in TFP.4 And fourth, the continuation of very rapid growth after 2000 has
broken the simple correlation that emerged in the late 1990s, where faster
productivity growth coincided with rapid growth of IT capital.
On balance, IT is indeed an important enabling technology that, when
accompanied by business process innovation, can allow companies to
raise their productivity. But the important thing is for companies to ﬁgure
out how to improve their products or processes. Those that buy IT capital
without a clear understanding of how it will improve operations tend to
ﬁnd little or no payoff.
Robert J. Gordon 283
3. McKinsey Global Institute (2001).
4. Triplett and Bosworth (2002).
1790-03_Gordon.qxd  01/06/04  10:32  Page 283One reason for the rapid productivity growth of the 1990s that contin-
ued to operate strongly through the 2001 downturn is that companies
faced very strong competitive pressure with little effective resistance
from labor. An interesting ﬁnding in Gordon’s paper is that the cyclical
pattern of productivity looks different since the mid-1980s. The shifts in
both trend growth and cyclical responsiveness indicate that there may
have been structural changes in the economy brought about by a combi-
nation of deregulation, globalization, and a loss of labor’s bargaining
power, with the following consequences. They have made it both easier
and more essential for companies to make changes in their operations,
including outsourcing. They have forced companies to lay off workers
who are not needed immediately. And they have placed very strong per-
formance pressures on individual employees.
In his discussion of intangible capital and the likely delays in achieving
the potential impact of IT capital, Gordon addresses some of these same
issues. He makes a valuable contribution toward extending the growth
accounting framework and making it more realistic. There is still a way to
go before we have a complete formulation, but he provides an important
start on the problem. One must be careful about interpretation, however.
Altering the growth accounting framework may make its results more
consistent with some facts—such as the persistence of rapid productivity
growth even as technology spending slumped. But that comes at a price. It
was the coincident timing of heavy IT spending and productivity acceler-
ation from 1995 to 2000 that made so many people into converts to the
New Economy. That evidence is weakened once one allows for delayed
effects and the need for intangible capital. 
Turning to the issue of the long-run growth estimates used by the
Social Security Administration and the difﬁculty of estimating how fast
GDP will grow over the long run, I ﬁrst want to point to a striking regu-
larity. Over the twentieth century as a whole (1899 to 1999, to be precise),
GNP per capita in the United States grew at 2.1 percent a year on average.
Over the ﬁrst half of the century, growth averaged 2.0 percent a year, and
over the second half it was 2.2 percent. There was some variation over
subperiods, notably during the Great Depression. But there was less vari-
ation than one might imagine during the second half of the century. GNP
per capita grew at an average rate of 2.4 percent a year over 1948–73, at
1.9 percent over 1973–90, and at 2.1 percent over 1990–99. These ﬁgures
all are taken from the Economic Report of the President, 2000, and my
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the “2 percent solution.” If you want to know how fast the U.S. economy
will grow over the long run, the answer is 2 percent per capita per year,
give or take a little. Of course, as the prospectuses always say, the past
may not be a guide to the future, so it is helpful also to look, as Gordon
does, at the ingredients that go into output growth: population, labor
force, hours worked per employee, and productivity.
Gordon attributes much of the recent growth to IT, which suggests that,
once Moore’s Law has run its course, productivity growth could slow
sharply. However, he remains somewhat optimistic, suggesting that
2
1⁄2 percent a year is an appropriate forecast over the next twenty years for
labor productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector. That is a pretty
good number. My own estimate of the current productivity growth trend
is that it is running at around 2
1⁄2 percent a year, or maybe 2
3⁄4 percent if the
recent data hold up. But if forced to forecast twenty-ﬁve years into the
future, I would be a bit more cautious than Gordon. It is certainly possible
that the economy will return to something closer to the 1.4 percent annual
growth rate that the United States experienced for over twenty years.
Alternatively, if one takes the very long term as a guide, business sector
output per hour grew at 2.1 percent a year on average over the twentieth
century, and the farm sector contributed positively to that growth. So non-
farm business productivity was probably around 2 percent a year. I would
be comfortable using a projection of 2
1⁄2 to 2
3⁄4 percent a year for the next
ﬁve years. For a seventy-ﬁve-year projection, I would use 2 percent a
year. For a twenty-year horizon, 2
1⁄4 percent growth looks sensible.
On population and immigration, there are more questions than
answers. The impact of immigration will depend on the productivity of
the people who come and how rapidly they assimilate into the American
economy. On the ﬁrst of these, immigration into the United States is
bimodal: many individuals of high ability come to work in programming
and other professions, but at the same time there appears to be a whole
class of low-wage jobs that Americans do not want and are now ﬁlled by
immigrants. Of course, the same was true in earlier periods of high immi-
gration. And it may be that the next generation of immigrants will acquire
skills and education and move up the wage and productivity ladder, but
that is an open question.
After redoing Okun’s analysis, Gordon concludes that, once lags are
considered, the Okun coefﬁcient is closer to 2 than to 3. That result seems
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study. Gordon ﬁnds the NAIRU to be between 5.2 and 5.4 percent, very
close to the ﬁgure of 5+ percent that has prevailed in CEA forecasts span-
ning several administrations. Whether the NAIRU is a meaningful con-
cept is still debated. For me the idea that at any given time there is a
constraint on the ability of demand policies to increase output without
also increasing inﬂation seems highly plausible and is consistent with
Okun’s original analysis of potential output. Presumably, at any given
time there is an unemployment rate associated with the inﬂation con-
straint, but there is no guarantee that the NAIRU deﬁned in this way will
remain ﬁxed over time. One criticism of the NAIRU, however, is surely
correct. Even if the unemployment rate were to stay stuck above the
NAIRU, it does not seem remotely plausible that inﬂation would decline
at an ever-faster rate.
Finally, there is the issue of American exceptionalism. Is it possible
that the United States will continue to have faster productivity growth
than Europe for an extended period? That is an interesting question, and
one that is related to a whole branch of research in recent years. Gordon
implicitly has a convergence model in mind: Technologies developed in
one country can be used in others. If capital is in short supply, it will ﬂow
in from outside. But we also know that convergence is not guaranteed.
Many—indeed, most—of the countries of the world have not converged
toward U.S. levels of GDP per capita or productivity. Technologies and
business practices used in one country do not necessarily flow to all
countries.
An emerging view in the literature suggests that institutions, legal
arrangements, property rights, market ﬂexibility, regulation, and eco-
nomic policies are key factors in determining whether convergence takes
place. Sometimes this is posed as a debate between the institutional view
and the policy view, but the two are not orthogonal. The paper by Barry
Bosworth and Susan Collins in this volume is relevant to that discussion.
On Europe speciﬁcally, although it is important to remember that not
all European countries are alike, the larger continental countries have
gone down a different economic road than the United States. Their
economies have less ﬂexibility, less competition, and a more restrictive
set of labor market rules. The result has been a society with less economic
insecurity than the United States, but also less employment and somewhat
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Europe and the United States will converge economically depends on
whether Europe is willing to undertake reforms.6
This was an enjoyable paper whose conclusions have been developed
and sharpened as it has progressed. It did not raise my blood pressure,
which has not always been true of Gordon’s papers in the past. That is
good in that it suggests broader consensuses are emerging, even though it
makes for less combative comments.
Daniel E. Sichel:1 Continuing a long-standing tradition of the Brookings
Panel, Robert Gordon has written another interesting paper on productiv-
ity, and I am happy to have the opportunity to discuss it. Gordon does
three big things in this paper. First, he sets up the usual decomposition of
output growth into its supply-side components, detrends each piece of the
decomposition, and estimates a dynamic error correction model for each.
Second, he uses this machinery to examine several interesting questions:
How unusual is the pattern of labor productivity growth since 2000? What
is the current trend in that growth? How has the Okun’s Law relationship
held up recently? Given his estimates that labor productivity growth in
recent years was much stronger than predicted by his dynamic model,
Gordon explores possible reasons for the unusual performance. Finally,
he puts together a plausible projection of potential output growth for the
next twenty years.
This paper covers a lot of ground, and Gordon provides some useful
insights into the recent behavior of productivity. In my judgment, the
paper proposes some plausible explanations for the surprising strength in
productivity growth over the past couple of years, but it does not nail down
the likely quantitative contribution of these alternative explanations. Here
I will focus primarily on Gordon’s estimates of trend productivity growth
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as high as or higher than the United States, but estimates of business sector productivity
show a productivity gap in the United States’ favor. See, for example, O’Mahony and de
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6. See my book on European reform, to be published in the spring of 2004 (Baily,
forthcoming). 
1. The views expressed in this comment are the author’s alone and should not be attrib-
uted to any member of the Federal Reserve Board or its staff.
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comments on the other elements of his paper as well. 
I will start with Gordon’s estimate of trend productivity. He uses an
average of a trend from an H-P ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 6,400
and a trend estimated with a Kalman ﬁlter model. This procedure suggests
that trend productivity has increased at an annual rate of about 3 percent
from 2001 to the present. Given his past pessimism on productivity
growth, an estimate of this magnitude from Gordon is noteworthy. It is
considerably faster than many other researchers have suggested recently,
and it points to a dramatic shift in the productivity debate. As recently as
mid-2002, the debate still centered on how much of the post-1995 pickup
was permanent and how much was transitory.2 Now the debate is focused
on how much further trend productivity growth might have increased
beyond its 1995–2000 pace.
Although both the H-P and the Kalman ﬁlters have been used exten-
sively and may be delivering a sensible estimate, some issues can be
raised with Gordon’s procedure. The H-P ﬁlter suffers from well-known
endpoint problems, which make its uses somewhat problematic for
obtaining trend estimates for recent years. Also, it is a univariate proce-
dure and as such does not take account of information in other economic
variables. In addition, the choice of the smoothing parameter is arbitrary.
The simple type of Kalman ﬁlter model that Gordon estimates potentially
avoids these problems: it is possible to estimate the smoothing parameter
and to introduce information from other variables. However, one issue
may remain. Because the latest observations on output—which are cru-
cially important to the estimate of current trend productivity—have not
been through an annual revision, they are likely to be more subject to
measurement error than earlier observations. If so, it might be appropriate
to reduce the inﬂuence of the most recent observations on estimates of
trend productivity. Given these technical issues, it might be better to
avoid the H-P ﬁlter and reﬁne the estimates from the Kalman ﬁlter alone.3
Conditional on this estimate of trend, Gordon uses his dynamic model
to judge the size of the surprise in productivity growth relative to his esti-
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man Sachs published a piece that began as follows: “Rest in peace, New Economy: it was
fun while it lasted” (Goldman Sachs, “RIP, New Economy,” U.S. Economics newsletter,
August 14, 2002).
3. For a more full-blown Kalman ﬁlter model of trend productivity, see Roberts (2001).
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In any case, the results in Gordon’s table 8 suggest that productivity has
increased about 1
1⁄2 percentage points a year faster since 2001:4 than the
model can explain.4 However, if one believed that the current trend in pro-
ductivity growth were less than 3 percent, then the surprise would be
larger; conversely, if one believed that the current trend were greater than
3 percent, the surprise would be smaller.
Gordon proposes several explanations of the surprise in productivity
growth. Of the two he ﬁnds most compelling, the ﬁrst is “that an unusual
degree of downward pressure on proﬁts led to unusually aggressive cost
cutting by ﬁrms.” I ﬁnd it plausible that ﬁrms have squeezed extra efﬁ-
ciency out of their current employees, although they may have done this
for reasons other than the proﬁt-squeeze story. (For example, greater-
than-usual uncertainty about the timing and strength of the recovery may
have led to greater-than-usual reluctance of ﬁrms to hire. Or, less neoclas-
sically, ﬁrms became fat and lazy during the boom years and have been
squeezing out those inefﬁciencies in the past couple of years.) It is impor-
tant to emphasize that explanations of this sort suggest, at best, a one-time
shift in the level of productivity. That is, once these efﬁciency gains have
been achieved, there is no reason to believe that further gains of this sort
are possible or that trend productivity growth will get a boost from this
source in the longer run. Indeed, it is even likely that a portion of the gains
that come from squeezing workers harder will be reversed once the labor
market tightens. In any case, Gordon does not quantify the productivity
gains that might be coming from ﬁrms achieving these sorts of one-time
increases in efﬁciency.
Gordon’s second leading explanation hinges on two elements: a delay
between the acquisition of information technology (IT) capital and its
productivity effect (in the spirit of Paul David’s analogy to the delayed
productivity impact of electric motors a century ago), and a surge in pur-
chases of unmeasured intangible capital in the late 1990s. The basic idea
is that, in the late 1990s, ﬁrms invested heavily in IT-related intangible
capital—which was not counted in the ofﬁcial output statistics—and that
that capital recently became productive and has boosted measured pro-
ductivity growth in the past couple of years. Gordon suggests that,
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2001:4–2002:3 (2.02 percentage points) and the residual over 2002:4–2003:2 (0.75 per-
centage point). 
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stated by 0.5 to 0.6 percentage point a year in the late 1990s and that it is
being overstated by somewhat less now.
This calculation starts with an assumed investment share for these
intangible investments and an assumption that they grew at the same rate
as real investment in IT during 1995–2000. (For example, the paper notes
that the growth rate of real investment in computer hardware and software
was 22.5 percent a year over this period.) It seems plausible to me that
investment in IT-related intangibles could have increased at the rate of
growth of nominal IT investment; for computer hardware and software
together, that rate averaged about 13 percent from 1995 to 2000, accord-
ing to estimates by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.5 But it is harder for
me to believe that prices for intangibles are falling anywhere near as fast
as prices for tangible IT; that is, it is hard to see how organizational capi-
tal could undergo as rapid a pace of technical change as, say, computer
hardware. Thus it appears likely that real spending for intangibles rose
more slowly in the late 1990s than real spending for IT. If so, the esti-
mated effect of the intangibles-and-delay hypothesis on productivity
growth in recent years would be smaller than suggested by Gordon’s
estimates.
More broadly, Gordon’s story about intangible capital and delay seems
qualitatively plausible to me. Quantitatively, I am at more of a loss. For
the reason described above, I am unsure that Gordon’s estimates are right.
Moreover, I would encourage further speciﬁcity about the types of intan-
gible investment that have been delayed and the speciﬁc sources of that
delay. Such speciﬁcity, along with an actual model, would make it easier
to assess the empirical magnitude of the various delay hypotheses.
Gordon also considers, and largely dismisses, other possible explana-
tions of the productivity surprise. On the measurement front, these
include the argument that the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ household sur-
vey gives a more accurate picture of employment during a cyclical recov-
ery than does the Bureau’s payroll survey, as well as the story that
unmeasured hours of work have increased substantially recently. For the
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estimated that nominal spending on intangibles excluding software (which is already
counted in ofﬁcial GDP measures) increased at an annual rate of 8
1⁄2 percent from the mid-
1990s to the late 1990s, very similar to the rate of increase in nominal outlays for computer
hardware. 
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to be important parts of the explanation of the recent productivity sur-
prise. On the household versus payroll debate, I would add that the
Bureau recently changed the procedures for the payroll survey in a way
that should improve its ability to track employment during cyclical recov-
eries. One other measurement issue that should be mentioned is that the
analysis in the paper is based on GDP data from before the benchmark
revision of the National Income and Product Accounts in December 2003.
It is always possible that this revision will change the productivity
picture.
Gordon also explores the possibility that greater outsourcing of white-
collar jobs has been a source of productivity improvement in recent years.
I agree with Gordon’s conclusion that this factor is unlikely to explain a
large part of the pickup in productivity growth in the past couple of years
or in the mid-1990s. However, I believe that the channel through which
outsourcing affects productivity growth could be more complicated than
the example in the paper suggests. Indeed, it is even possible (although
perhaps not likely) that outsourcing could lower U.S. productivity growth
as well as raise it.
For example, consider the simple case in which high-productivity
workers (and the capital they work with) are outsourced. In this case, all
else equal, the average productivity level of workers still in the United
States would be lower than before, because there would be fewer high-
productivity workers in the United States. Much of the recent media cov-
erage of outsourcing has focused on white-collar jobs, some of which are
likely to be high-productivity jobs such as those of software engineers. Of
course, many factors would affect the impact of outsourcing on produc-
tivity, including what happens to the capital that the outsourced worker
had been using. If that capital stayed in the United States to be used by
other workers, the additional capital per worker would tend to increase
the productivity of the remaining workers. If instead that capital were
outsourced along with the labor, the extra capital would not be a plus for
U.S. productivity. In any case, my sense is that tracking the effect of out-
sourcing on productivity growth is complicated, both theoretically and
empirically.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing one further point that Gordon makes
about outsourcing. The illustrative example in the paper potentially tells
us something about the contribution of outsourcing to productivity
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of productivity (or the earlier, mid-1990s acceleration), it would need to
be the case that the pace of outsourcing has picked up. Yet, as Gordon
points out, the speedup in outsourcing in recent years likely has been rel-
atively small.
The last part of the paper turns to providing an estimate of potential
output growth over the next twenty years. Gordon’s estimate is about
3
1⁄4 percent a year, composed of a contribution from trend productivity
growth of 2
1⁄2 percentage points and a contribution from demographic and
labor market factors of 
3⁄4 percentage point. The demographic and labor
market analysis is quite interesting and highlights the difﬁcult choices
that must be made. I want to highlight two aspects of Gordon’s estimate
of potential output.
First, on the demographic side, his estimates suggest that the simple
rule of thumb for translating labor productivity growth into potential out-
put that many analysts have used for years will need to be modiﬁed. The
old rule of thumb was to add 1 percentage point to productivity growth to
get potential output growth. Gordon’s new rule is to add 
3⁄4 percentage
point.
Second, his long-run trend productivity estimate of 2
1⁄2 percent a year is
less than his estimate of trend productivity growth in 2001–03 of 3 per-
cent a year. For long-run budgeting purposes, it seems wise to be conser-
vative about the long-run prospects for productivity growth relative to the
latest estimate of trend growth. In addition, Gordon’s estimate of 2
1⁄2 per-
cent a year is consistent with the midrange of estimates of sustainable pro-
ductivity growth that Stephen Oliner and I developed in a recent paper.6
In that paper we analyzed the steady-state properties of a multisector
growth model. This procedure provided a way to translate views about
growth fundamentals (such as the rate of total factor productivity growth
in the semiconductor and computer industries) into estimates of labor pro-
ductivity growth. Within this framework, conservative assumptions about
fundamentals generated sustainable productivity growth of about 2 per-
cent a year, but more optimistic assumptions generated sustainable pro-
ductivity growth of nearly 3 percent a year. If it were assumed that an
even more substantial part of the recent productivity surprise represented
292 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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able productivity growth above 3 percent. 
After all of the pieces have been put together, where does the paper’s
analysis leave us? Gordon’s estimate of trend annual productivity growth
for recent years is 3 percent, which he anticipates will drop back to 2
1⁄2 per-
cent in the longer run. The paper does not provide an explicit accounting
of why the productivity trend has picked up so much, although some of
the proposed explanations for the recent productivity puzzle could serve
as explanations for the pickup in the trend as well. As for the recent puz-
zle, Gordon does a very nice job of identifying potential sources of rapid
productivity growth in recent years. However, we still do not have a com-
plete quantitative accounting, which suggests that scope remains for fur-
ther work on understanding the recent behavior of productivity.
General discussion: Some on the panel discussed the need for the paper
to go much further in dealing with the uncertainty in estimates of the pro-
ductivity trend and in projections of future GDP trends. Steven Durlauf
noted Gordon’s recognition that projections were uncertain but reasoned
that, to be useful for policymakers, projections must somehow quantify
that uncertainty and report the error bands that surround estimates and
projections. Christopher Sims found the absence of even an informal
analysis of uncertainty a serious defect and related this to the fact that the
estimates of trends in the variables of interest were not accompanied by
any measure of uncertainty. He observed that this problem was wide-
spread in the analysis of economic time series, where the objective is
often to remove trends so as to better examine what is left. Although this
approach is useful in estimating seasonality, for example, which is clearly
present in many time series, it is not useful for separating business cycle
ﬂuctuations from trends since they are smoothly merged in the data. For
this reason it is important to detrend time series with a methodology that
treats cyclical and low-frequency variations jointly and provides some
evidence on the uncertainty of both trend and cyclical components. Esti-
mating trends with H-P ﬁlters or by connecting apparent cyclical peaks
does none of this. If a methodology that provided some handle on the
uncertainty were available, a useful presentation of the long-run projec-
tions in the paper would be a fan chart that illustrated the likely range of
outcomes and provided some basis for discussion of those outcomes. 
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cyclical term were a way to isolate trend and cycle, and he questioned the
merging of these with the other estimates in the paper. Because the other
methods did not explicitly deal with the cyclical frequencies, the trend
estimates were cyclically contaminated and the estimates of Okun’s coef-
ﬁcient were biased. Edmund Phelps was not as bothered by the apparent
cyclicality of the H-P ﬁlter estimates. He said that his own studies had
convinced him that the observed swings in the unemployment rate were
variations in what could loosely be called the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. On this view, substantial variability in the trend is not surprising
and should not be removed from the data. 
Several panelists discussed the strong productivity growth of the last
three years. Jeffrey Frankel argued that part of this growth came from
ﬁrms’ response to the proﬁts disappointments that followed the boom
years. The urgent need to show better proﬁts led ﬁrms to minimize
employment during the initial quarters of economic recovery. But such
economizing represents, at best, a one-time adjustment in employment
levels. So this part of recent productivity gains is not sustainable and
should not inﬂuence estimates of the productivity trend. As evidence that
the productivity surge is temporary, Frankel noted that real wages, which
typically rise in pace with the productivity trend, have risen only mod-
estly over the past three years. Phelps offered two explanations for the
recent productivity surge. He suggested that ﬁrms have been shedding
employees who had been involved in forward-looking activities such as
research and corporate planning but were not essential to current produc-
tion. He added that labor hoarding by ﬁrms during the last phase of the
boom could also be part of the explanation: ﬁrms had been overly opti-
mistic when the economy initially slowed, hanging on to workers in the
expectation that business would soon improve. As expectations became
more realistic, they shed this hoarded labor. 
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